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Abstract
The indispensability argument (ia) comes in many different versions that all reduce to
a general valid schema. Providing a sound ia amounts to providing a full interpretation of
the schema according to which all its premises are true. Hence, arguing whether ia is sound
results in wondering whether the schema admits such an interpretation. We discuss in full
details all the parameters on which the specification of the general schema may depend. In
doing this, we consider how different versions of ia can be obtained, also through different
specifications of the notion of indispensability. We then distinguish between schematic and
genuine ia, andargue that no genuine (non-vacuously and non-circularly) sound ia is avail-
able or easily forthcoming. We then submit that this holds also in the particularly relevant
case in which indispensability is conceived as explanatory indispensability.
∗Many thanks to the audience of the Indispensability and Explanation workshop held at IHPST in Paris in
November 19-20, 2012, where this paper was first presented. We are particularly grateful to Henri Galinon for
his useful rejoinder at the conference and for subsequent discussion. The authors would like to thank the projects
which financially supported their research for this article. Marco Panza wishes to thank the ANR-DFG Project
Mathematical objectivity by representation. Andrea Sereni wishes to thank the Italian National Project PRIN
2010 Realism and Objectivity.
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1 Introduction
What is today repeatedly called ‘Indispensability Argument’—henceforth, ia—is, in fact, a large
and multifarious family of different arguments1. Although most of them concern mathematics, the
basic underlying idea applies to other domains. As a matter of fact, indispensability arguments
exemplify a well-recognizable Quinean strategy in ontology. Suppose we have a class of theories of
such a kind that we possess fairly clear means of establishing whether they are true (or justified, or
confirmed, or the like) and, modulo some suitable formulation, whether the objects they purports
to be about do exist (or whether belief in their existence is justified, or confirmed, or the like).
Suppose that we have theories of another disputed class, a class for which we lack those probatory
means, at least insofar as we look at them in isolation from their interaction with other theories.
If we have a way of showing that appeal to theories of this second class cannot—in some sense to
be further specified—be avoided by theories of the first class, we may have a reason to think that
some appropriate semantic or epistemic property (truth, justification or confirmation being just
some examples) is transferred from the former to the latter. This will give us indirect probatory
means like those at our disposal for theories in the former class; this will then allow us to establish
whether theories in the second class are true (or justified, or confirmed, or the like) and whether
the objects they purport to be about exist (or the claim that they exist is justified, or confirmed,
or the like).
Even though versions of the argument can be adapted to support claims unconcerned with
ontology (e.g. that the theories in the disputed class have some suitable semantic or epistemic
property quite independently of which objects they are about, and even independently of the very
fact that they may be about objects at all), its role in ontology is paramount. Recently, O. Bueno
and S. A. Shalkowski ([Bueno and Shalkowski., 2015], pp. 231-32) have thus summarized a typical
application of the argument when the main concern is ontology2:
1In what follows, we shall distinguish between genuine (or fully determinate) arguments and argument schemas.
We shall generally speak of arguments tout court in order to refer either to the former or to the latter or to both
at once.
2As Bueno and Shalkowski make clear, “the indispensability argument per se does not establish the nature of
[. . . ][the relevant] objects (whether such objects are contingent or not) nor does it establish the form of knowledge
one may have [. . . ] (whether such knowledge is a priori or not). The argument [. . . ] only establishes that we
ought to be ontologically committed to [. . . ][these] objects. This leaves open the possibility of using indispens-
ability considerations in support of an ontology of non-contingent objects whose knowledge is justified on a priori
grounds.” As we also have stressed somewhere else (cf. [Panza and Sereni, 2015]), although the indispensability
argument, being based on premises that may be established on a posteriori grounds—such as the form that proper
formulations of scientific theories must take in order to be suitable for description, explanation or prediction—is
usually a powerful tool in the hands of empiricists willing to defend the existence of mathematical abstract objects
on empirical grounds, the argument per se does not rule out the availability of other a priori reasons for believing
in those objects—in which case, it will at most offer some auxiliary, defeasible, and less than ideal evidence for
the wanted conclusion
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Indispensability considerations : Positing certain objects is sometimes thought to be
indispensable to express certain claims about the world, or to provide a systematic
description of a certain range of phenomena. [. . . ] Hence, we are ontologically com-
mitted to such objects. [. . . ] a weaker form of the indispensability argument can
be formulated as a theoretical utility argument. In this version of the argument, the
fact that reference to a certain class of objects, is theoretically useful provides reason
to believe in such objects. Simplicity, unification, expressive and explanatory power
are all virtues that are commonly invoked in support of the belief in the objects in
question.
This should be enough to show that ia does not need to be confined to enquiries about math-
ematics. And in fact it isn’t. Examples could be multiplied. One is offered by M. Colyvan
([Colyvan, 2001], p. 16) who, following a suggestion from S. J. Wagner ([Wagner, 1996], p. 76),
has sketched a “semantic indispensability argument”, based on the indispensability of the “ap-
parent reference” to abstract entities like predicates and logical operators for our “best semantic
theories”3. Another is given by [Enoch and Schechter, 2008], where the appeal to the indispens-
ability of some basic forms of inference to some unavoidable rational projects is used in order to
claim that thinkers are justified in adopting those forms of inference4.
In the present paper, we shall not be concerned with such a variety of arguments, however.
We shall rather focus on the forms that ia takes when it is concerned with mathematics. For the
sake of simplicity, this restriction of context will be left implicit throughout, unless required: we
shall merely speak of ia or ia’s to refer to arguments concerned with mathematics. One of our
main theses will indeed be that also when it is so restricted, ia displays quite a large variety of
possible forms. We shall suggest ways of classifying these forms and of dealing with all or several
of them at once.
Let us start by observing that, although all these forms include a crucial premise roughly
stating that mathematics plays an indispensable role in science, their ultimate purpose may vary
from case to case. As a consequence, their conclusion varies too, though it always aims at stating
either a form of ontological mathematical platonism (as we shall call it), this being roughly the
thesis that there exist objects that mathematics is about5, or a form of mathematical veridicalism
3Something akin to a form of indispensability argument for abstract entities in semantics can be traced back
to [Church, 1951]. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to Church’s classic paper in this connection.
As noticed by [Psillos, 1999], pp.10-11, the indispensability of the use of theoretical terms in the formulation of
“efficacious” systems of laws is claimed in [Carnap, 1939], p.64.
4Thanks to Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani for bringing this to our attention.
5This thesis (or similar ones) is usually identified with mathematical platonism tout court. We take it to stand
for ontological mathematical platonism for the reason that we take mathematical platonism tout court to stand
for the more general thesis that mathematical statements are about some objects. It seems possible to argue for
this latter claim without arguing for the existence of these objects (at least if the notion of existence is considered,
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(as we shall call it), this being roughly the thesis that mathematical theorems, or other appropriate
mathematical statements, are true6.
This variety of arguments is often acknowledged, albeit implicitly, also in the limited case of
mathematics. Colyvan speaks for instance of ‘indispensability arguments’ in the plural in order to
identify the subject-matter of his influential book, in which several and quite different examples
are discussed ([Colyvan, 2001], esp. § 1.2). More recently, the label ‘Enhanced Indispensability
Argument’ coined by A. Baker to refer to his well-know argument (cf. page §3.5, below), suggests
the availability of yet different ia’s. To the best of our knowledge, however, before we tentatively
tackled the question in [Panza and Sereni, 2013], (ch. 6) and [Panza and Sereni, 2015], no thor-
ough investigation had been pursued in order to identify and clarify both the traits common to
all possible ia’s (or to ia itself, considered as a whole family of arguments), those features that
are specific to each of them, and the way a single such argument may be obtained through the
specification of a general pattern.
In those occasions, we suggested that the different ia’s available in the current debate could
be traced back to four argument schemas, respectively identifying arguments for platonism and
veridicalism7, either in epistemic or non-epistemic form—a non-epistemic argument for p being
conceived as an argument whose conclusion is just p, and an epistemic one as an argument whose
conclusion is that we are justified in believing p (or in taking p to be true, or generally to hold),
or that p is justified (or that p is to be justifiably taken to be true, or generally to hold)8.
Our present purpose is twofold: on the one hand, we want to come back to this issue in more
details, also by discussing soundness conditions for ia’s, including those which are based on the
explanatory role of mathematics; on the other hand, we want to offer evidence in support of the
claim that no genuine (non-vacuously and non-circularly) sound ia is currently available, and at
as it usually is, as an universal and primitive notion already clear in itself). This issue goes beyond the scope of
the present paper, however.
6This thesis is often referred to by labels such as ‘mathematical realism’, ‘semantic realism in mathematics’,
or similar ones. We adopted this convention in [Panza and Sereni, 2013], but we opt here for ‘mathematical
veridicalism’ in order to avoid confusion with other theses often referred to as ‘realism’, such as the thesis that
mathematical statements have a determinate truth value independently of any sort of justification one may have
for them. On some occasions, the bare term ‘realism’ is used to refer to ontological realism, i.e. platonism, e.g. in
[Field, 1982]. We avoid this use. . We will later identify another possible conclusion for IAs beyond ontological
mathematical platonism and veridicalism, which will be labeled externality; cf. Sect. 3.6.
7Cf. footnote 6, above.
8We shall prefer the latter passive formulation (‘p is justified’) to the active one (‘We are justified in believing
in p’), but we do not mean to attach any particular relevance here to the distinction between doxastic and
propositional justification. Notice that the conclusions of many ia’s are stated in terms of ought’s: namely, that
we ought to do something, e.g. to believe in the relevant thesis, or to be commited to the relevant objects. For
our present purpose, we just assume that if we are justified in believing a given thesis, we ought to believe it, that
we ought to believe it just in case we are justified in believing it, and that being committed to some objects is the
same as believing that they exist.
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the same time raise doubts that any may be forthcoming – cf. §2 and Footnote 10 for clarifications
of the notions of genuine ia, and non-circular and non-vacuous soundness. Our discussion will
then by necessity be conducted at a certain degree of generality: in broad terms, we will point to
those general schemas that different versions of ia exemplify, and we will motivate our skepticism
that (non-vacuously and non-circularly) sound instances of those schemas can really be offered.
We have however made explicit, wherever possible, all connections with the relevant aspects of
the current debate and with the most common versions of ia.
The discussion will be divided into three main sections. In section 2, we introduce the distinc-
tion between genuine and schematic ia’s. In section 3, we focus on several aspects of schematic
ia’s: we offer a general argument schema from which several different formulations can be ob-
tained via the specification of various parameters; we introduce the distinction between proper
and strengthened ia’s; we discuss the distinction between ontological and epistemic ia’s; we offer
a detailed analysis of what we take the notion of indispensability to come to, and of what we take
to be indispensable to what; and, finally, we distinguish between ia’s with different conclusions.
In section 4, we then focus on the possibility of obtaining genuine (non-circularly) sound ia’s
from specifications of the various parameters of the main argument schema: we first consider the
features of the strengthened ia’s, and then discuss at length the possibility of obtaining genuine
(non-circularly) sound ia’s (proper or strengthened) based either on descriptive and predictive
indispensability, or, eventually, on explanatory indispensability. We finally offer some conclud-
ing remarks to summarize the outcome of our discussion and to sustain our skepticism that any
genuine (non-circularly) sound ia is available or forthcoming.
To help the reader follow our arguments without too much distress for the amount of technical
details, at the beginning of each section and subsection we offer general and rather relaxed digests
(typographically signaled by indented paragraphs), in which the main points of the following
arguments are summarized.
2 Schematic and Genuine ia’s
Section summary. We distinguish between schematic and genuine ia’s. We suggest
that any single ia results from successive specifications of a unique pattern provided
by a general argument schema, Sc.IA0. Specifications of Sc.IA0 proceed through
progressive specifications of its indeterminate parameters with progressively more de-
terminate constants (in a sense to be clarified). Genuine ia’s are those in which all
indeterminate parameters are replaced by fully determinate constants. We discuss
validity and soundness for both schematic and genuine ia’s. We suggest that, apart
from trivial or inadmissible cases, Sc.IA0 is such that it cannot be claimed to be sound
or unsound by itself, but only when some appropriate specification of it is offered.
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We suggest that any single indispensability argument should be considered as resulting from
successive specifications of a unique pattern, provided by a general argument schema, which
we call ‘Sc.IA0’9. By this we mean that this pattern consists in a system of formulas (namely
three premises and one conclusion) including some indeterminate parameters, together with some
replacement clauses. Passing from this general schema to a single determinate ia requires replacing
all the indeterminate parameters with appropriate, fully determinate constants (namely constants
whose intended meaning has been fixed precisely, or at least as clearly as it is required to avoid
ambiguities within the relevant community of experts), according to these clauses. We shall
call any single argument obtained in this way ‘genuine ia’. A genuine ia will thus be a system
of statements (three premises and one conclusion) involving (together with logical constants and
bound variables, if any) only fully determinate constants. It follows that, even once the validity of
a schematic ia is granted, the truth of the premises of a genuine ia, and thus the soundness of the
latter, will hinge on the availability of suitable replacements for all the indeterminate parameters
in the corresponding premises of Sc.IA0 with such constants (this shall become clearer later).
We shall describe the passage from Sc.IA0 to a genuine ia as a process involving different
steps: at each step the indeterminate parameters which occur in the argument schema at the
previous step, or some of them, are replaced with other, less indeterminate parameters, or with
fully determinate constants. We take an indeterminate parameter to be less indeterminate than
another if the latter admits of all replacements admitted by the former, but not vice versa. It
follows that, with the only exception of the final step resulting in a genuine ia, any such step
transforms an argument schema into another, less indeterminate, argument schema. We shall call
any such argument schema ‘schematic ia’. Sc.IA0 is then a schematic ia, and any genuine ia is to
be regarded as an instance of it. It can be seen as the single root of a tree, whose final outcomes
are different genuine ia’s and whose intermediate nodes are schematic ia’s, all less indeterminate
than Sc.IA0. The whole process by which the entire tree is obtained can then be viewed as resting
on alternative progressive determinations of the indeterminate parameters.
We take argument schemas to be either valid or invalid (according to an underlying logic).
Sc.IA0 is valid (according to a wide selection of logics, including classical and intuitionist ones),
because the associated replacement clauses ensure that its indeterminate parameters admit of the
same replacement instances in any of their occurrences in the schema, and, once this condition is
satisfied, the schema’s conclusion follows logically from the premises (according to the underlying
logic). The way other schematic and genuine ia’s are obtained from the schema also ensures that
they are all valid (according to the same logics).
Things stands differently with soundness.
We can say that a valid argument schema is sound or unsound as such, only if it is such
that either all of its premises are true, or at least one of them is untrue, under any licensed
replacement of their indeterminate parameters with fully determinate constants. This can happen
9But cf. footnote (14), below.
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in three distinct cases. The first holds independently of which particular replacement clauses
are admitted: it can just be the case that all the premises of an argument schema are true
under any replacement of their indeterminate parameters with any fully determinate constant
of the appropriate syntactical type, or that some of these premises are untrue under any such
replacement. The second and the third case depend on the admitted replacement clauses instead.
The second case occurs when these clauses entail that all the premises of the schema are true under
any licensed replacement of their indeterminate parameters with fully determinate constants, or
that some of them are untrue under any such replacement. The third case occurs when the
replacement clauses are such that—though no single one of them is untrue under any licensed
replacement of their indeterminate parameters with constants—these premises are never all true
at once under any such replacement. Sc.IA0 falls neither under the first nor under the second
case. One of the main tasks we shall pursue in what follows is to investigate whether it falls under
the third one.
A genuine ia is of course sound if all of its premises are true. Hence, the problem is to see
whether it is possible to obtain a sound genuine ia from Sc.IA0 by the full determination of its
indeterminate parameters. In § 4 we shall argue that this is far from easy, if one wants to avoid
both the trivial case in which the argument is vacuously sound, and the inadmissible case in which
it is circular10. This suggests that once the determinations that would make Sc.IA0 vacuously
sound or circular are ruled out, the schema falls under the third among the previous cases.
To the best of our knowledge, no single indispensably argument advanced up to now rules
out this possibility. The reason is not that any such argument is unsound, vacuously sound or
circular, but rather that none of them is, as a matter of fact, a genuine ia. As a matter of fact, all
of them are schematic ia’s (falling neither under the first nor under the second cases), although
all certainly more determined than Sc.IA0.
3 Schematic ia’s
3.1 The General Argument Schema
Section summary. This section gives a formulation of the general argument schema for
ia that was introduced in the previous section. The argument is offered both in natural
language (Sc.IA0) and in a first-order formal language (*Sc.IA0). The formulations
display the parameters whose specification is required in order to obtain genuine ia’s.
10We call an argument ‘vacuously sound’ if all its premises are true, but at least one of them is vacuously so. We
call it ‘circular’ if one of its premises cannot be argued for if its conclusion is not previously granted. A circular
argument can of course be sound: this happens if all its premises (and then also the conclusion) are true. In this
case, it is said to be ‘circularly sound’. We shall give examples in § 4.
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It is also observed that any such argument delivers merely sufficient conditions for its
conclusion.
Let us begin by presenting Sc.IA0. It goes as follows:
[Sc.IA0]
i) Some scientific theories are P .
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical Q’s are L-indispensable
to them.
iii) If some Q’s are L-indispensable to some scientific theories which are P ,
then their a’s meet the condition A.
Hence
iv) The a’s of some mathematical Q’s meet the condition A.
This schema can easily be formalized in first-order predicate language:
[∗Sc.IA0]
i)∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x)]
ii)∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x) ∧ ∃y [Q (y) ∧Math (y) ∧ L-Ind (y, x)]] .
iii)∀y [Q (y)⇒ [∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x) ∧ L-Ind (y, x)]⇒ A (ay)]] .
Hence
iv)∃y [Q (y) ∧Math (y) ∧ A (ay)]
The existential quantification in ∗Sc.IA0 should not be taken as contributing to an explanation
of the meaning of the premises (i) and (ii) of Sc.IA0. It is rather the intended meaning of these
premises that should shed light on how the existential quantifiers involved in ∗Sc.IA0 are to be
understood. It remains, however, that ∗Sc.IA0 displays the logical form of Sc.IA0.
For one thing, it shows that premises (i) and (ii) are not independent of each other (since
the latter entails the former). Distinguishing them is just a way of emphasizing the crucial role
played by the assumption that some scientific theories have an appropriate property designated
by ‘P ’. ∗Sc.IA0 also makes clear that the word ‘some’ in premise (iii) is not intended to restrict
the range of the implication, but is rather part of the pluralisation of ‘Q’ (that is, ‘If some Q’s
are . . . then their a’s . . . ’ is not to be read as ‘For some Q’s, it happens that if they are . . . then
its a’s . . . ’, but as ‘It happens that if some Q’s are . . . then its a’s . . . ’)11. Furthermore, ∗Sc.IA0
makes clear that the replacement clauses relative to parameter ‘a’ have to specify the relations
linking the relevant Q’s and a’s (this is displayed by the rendering of this parameter through a
functional constant). Finally, ∗Sc.IA0 makes clear that, beyond the indeterminate parameters
‘P ’, ‘Q’, ‘L’, ‘a’ and ‘A’, Sc.IA0 involves also three non-logical constants: ‘scientific theories’,
11This use of ‘some’ in premise (iii) of Sc.IA0 might appear odd. We shall discuss the reason for adopting it in
§ 3.5.
8
‘mathematical’, and ‘indispensable’. Fixing the meaning of Sc.IA0 requires, then, both fixing the
replacement clauses relative to these parameters, and fixing the meaning to be assigned to these
non-logical constants.
Conclusion (iv) of Sc.IA0 (as well as ∗Sc.IA0) does not by itself display whether the conditions
expressed in the premises of the argument offer merely sufficient or also necessary conditions for
the relevant a’s sto meet the condition A. It is however important to notice that Sc.IA0 (as well
as ∗Sc.IA0) only offers sufficient conditions for its conclusion. As regards the specification of the
a’s of some mathematical Q’s which meet the condition A, all that Sc.IA0 and ∗Sc.IA0 say is,
indeed, this:
[Sc.IA0] Suf ) In order for the a’s of some mathematical Q’s to meet the condition
A, it is sufficient that these Q’s be L-indispensable to some scientific
theories which are P .
[∗Sc.IA0] Suf ) ∀z∀x
[[
Q (z) ∧Math (z)∧





As a matter of fact, this is nothing but a slight weakening of premise (iii)12. Hence, though
nothing would forbid adding it to the argument’s conclusion as an additional conjunct in (iv), this
would in no way make this conclusion in itself stronger or more perspicuous. It would however
make clear that the argument does not imply that the a’s of mathematical Q’s which are L-
indispensable to some scientific theories which are P are the only a’s of some Q’s that meet
condition A: as already said, the argument only gives sufficient conditions for these a’s to meet
this condition. This may not be the case for all possible formulations of ia, as we will see in the
next section.
3.2 Strengthened ia’s
Section summary. A strengthened version of schematic ia which delivers not just
sufficient but also necessary conditions for its conclusion is presented and discussed,
and distinguished from proper schematic ia, delivering only sufficient conditions. The
strenghtened argument is given both in natural language (Sc.SIA0) and in first-order
language (*Sc.SIA0). An additional clause expressing the required necessary condi-
tions is added to its conclusion. Although controversial, strengthened ia’s may be
used to account for the role of naturalism in the debate on ia.
Some may want to offer a version of ia offering not merely sufficient but also necessary
conditions for the a’s of some mathematical Q’s to meet the condition A, i.e. an argument for the
12This becomes evident when ∗Sc.SIA0.iii is written in prenex normal form.
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claim that the fact that Q’s are L-indispensable to some scientific theories which are P is both
sufficient and necessary for the relevant a’s to meet condition A. This is related to the alleged
role that the assumption of some form of naturalism concerning mathematics is meant to play
in some formulations of ia (such as that offered by [Colyvan, 2001], p. 11). When it is adapted
to the present setting, this is the form of naturalism which is involved in the claim that the a’s
of some mathematical Q’s meet the condition A only if these Q’s are L-indispensable to some
scientific theories which are P .
Once the distinction between merely sufficient and also necessary conditions offered by ia is
brought to the fore, it is easy to state a new argument schema, essentially different from Sc.IA0,
let us say Sc.SIA0 (reasons for this label will be clear soon), which delivers necessary conditions
for the a’s of some mathematical Q’s to meet the condition A. The first two premisses of this new
argument schema are just the same as those of Sc.IA0. The third premise is like that of Sc.IA0,
except for the fact that the if-then implication is replaced by a if-and-only-if implication. In place
of premise Sc.IA0.iii, Sc.SIA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0 include then the following premise:
[Sc.SIA0] iii) The a’s of some Q’s meet the condition A, if and only if these Q’s are
L-indispensable to some scientific theories which are P .
[∗Sc.SIA0] iii)∀y [Q (y)⇒ [∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x) ∧ L-Ind (y, x)]⇔ A (ay)]] .
Making this change does not affect, of course, the possibility of deriving conclusions Sc.SIA0.iv
and ∗Sc.SIA0.iv. But it allows to better specify the a’s of some mathematical Q’s which meet the
condition A. As regards to that, Sc.SIA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0 claim indeed for more than Sc.IA0 and
∗Sc.IA0, namely that:
[Sc.IA0] Nec-Suf ) In order for the a’s of some mathematical Q’s to meet the condition
A, it is necessary and sufficient that these Q’s be L-indispensable
to some scientific theories which are P .
[∗Sc.SIA0] Nec-Suf ) ∀z∀x
[[
Q (z) ∧Math (z)∧





In a way, the situation here parallels that of Sc.IA0 and ∗Sc.IA0; these are nothing but slight
variants of the new premises Sc.SIA0.iii and ∗Sc.SIA0.iii. Still, including them in the conclusion
has now two clear related advantages: it makes the right-to-left implication in these premisses
relevant (which is not the case, mutatis mutandis, in Colyvan’s formulation of the argument, as
he openly acknowledges: [Colyvan, 2001], p.12); and it makes manifest the additional strength of
premises Sc.SIA0.iii and ∗Sc.SIA0.iii over premises Sc.IA0.iii and ∗Sc.IA0.iii, by making evident
that, according to the new argument, only the a’s of mathematical theories Q considered in
premise (ii) both of Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0 meet condition A.
With this addition, the conclusions of Sc.SIA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0 take the following form:
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[Sc.SIA0] iv) The a’s of some mathematical Q’s meet the conditions A; namely,
this is so for the a’s of all mathematical Q’s which are L-indispensable
to some scientific theories which are P , and only for them.
[∗Sc.SIA0] iv)
∃y [Q (y) ∧Math (y) ∧ A (ay)]∧
∀z∀x
[[
Q (z) ∧Math (z)∧





Many discussions of ia’s make sense only if related to arguments with the logical structure
of Sc.SIA0. This is clear when the allegedly essential role of naturalism (roughly understood as
said above) in ia is discussed. Moreover, once appropriately determined, Sc.SIA0 seems to square
quite nicely with Quine’s views.
Still, an argument with the logical structure of Sc.SIA0 is too strong if one wishes such
an argument to respect the logical structure of the one first explicitly advanced by Putnam in
197113. For this delivers only a sufficient condition for the relevant mathematical items to be as
it claims they to be. Sc.SIA0, as well as any argument issued from it, should, then, be intended
as strengthened ia’s, and taken to differ essentially from proper ones14.
3.3 Ontological and Epistemic ia’s
Section summary. We begin the discussion of various possibilities of replacements for
indeterminate parameters in the schematic arguments Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0. In partic-
ular, several understandings of ‘scientific theories’ and of parameter ‘P ’ are discussed.
A broad distinction between ontological and epistemic argument is introduced. The
former are obtained by replacing ‘P ’ by predicates standing for properties which sci-
entific theories may possess only thanks to what they say of the world and how the
worlds actually is (e.g. truth, approximate truth, truth-likeness, high objective proba-
bility). The latter are obtained by replacing ‘P ’ by predicates standing for properties
which scientific theories may possess because of our epistemic attitudes towards them
(e.g. rationally justification, (empirical) confirmation, corroboration, high subjective
13 Cf. [Putnam, 1971], p. 347:
So far I have been developing an argument for realism roughly along the following lines: quantification
over mathematical entities is indispensable for science, both formal and physical, therefore we should
accept such quantification; but this commits us to accepting the existence of the mathematical entities
in question. This type of argument stems, of course, from Quine [. . . ]
We discuss the role of naturalism with respect to ia in [Panza and Sereni, 2015].
14In what follows we shall generically speak of ia’s either to refer both to proper and strengthened ia’s at once,
or in contexts where it is clear that the reference is to proper ones. We shall never specifically refer to strengthened
ia’s as ia’s tout court.
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probability). Less indeterminate parameters, namely ‘PO’ and ‘PE’, respectively, are
introduced to distinguish these two sorts of arguments.
Let us come now to the constants and parameters involved in Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0.
Let us begin with ‘scientific theories’. Though not all the ia’s currently discussed explicitly in-
clude this term, the reference to scientific theories is always there, possibly implicitly. In Putnam’s
original formulation15 for example, what is at stake is the indispensability of the “quantification
over mathematical entities [. . . ] for science”, but, clearly, ‘science’ is here meant to refer to some
(or possibly all) scientific theories.
What should we mean by ‘scientific theories’? A proper answer to this question is often either
ignored or simply presupposed in this context. In the (original) spirit of the argument, it will be
fair to assume that that term refers to actual construals widely admitted as being part of some
empirical science, this being conceived as some sort of enquiry (whose features can then be further
specified) resulting from some sort of empirical experimental practice16.
This pre-empts an important question: is mathematics to be considered as (part of) science?
The question whether it is (or better whether there is an appropriate meaning that could be
plausibly ascribed to the term ‘science’ according to which this is so, or whether mathematics
is continuous to what is usually and uncontroversially named ‘science’) is a complex and vexed
one. In the context of debates on ia, it has repeatedly been tackled by Penelope Maddy, who
criticizes Quine for unduly restricting the scope of science to natural sciences. For example, in
[Maddy, 1997, p. 184] she claims that:
To judge mathematical methods from any vantage-point outside mathematics, say
from the vantage-point of physics, seems to me to run counter to the fundamental
spirit that underlies all naturalism [. . . ] What I propose here is a mathematical nat-
uralism that extends the same respect to mathematical practice that the Quinean
naturalist extends to scientific practice. It is, after all, those methods—the actual
methods of mathematics—not the Quinean replacements, that have led to the re-
markable successes of modern mathematics. Where Quine holds that science is ‘not
15Cf. footnote (13), above.
16The recent discussion on ia’s usually places these arguments in a scientific realist framework, where scientific
theories are roughly conceived as literally, or at least approximately (if literally understood), true descriptions of
some external reality. This can be rendered in our schematic arguments by choosing an appropriate substitution
for ‘P ’, as well as by giving some appropriate further characterization of the features of scientific theories. It must
certainly be acknowledged that some of the views of earlier proponents of ia, like Quine and Putnam, can be
seen as conflicting with a scientific realist position (e.g. Quine’s views on ontological relativity or Putnam’s views
on internal realism). And, indeed, appropriate determinations of the parameters in our schemas, apt to reflect
appropriate conceptions of what scientific theories are intended to be, could also deliver genuine ia’s compatible
with those non-realist views. We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting a clarification of this point.
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answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal’ [. . . ] the mathematical naturalist adds
that mathematics is not answerable to any extra-mathematical tribunal and not in
need of any justification beyond proof and the axiomatic method17.
A proper investigation of this issue would take us far afield. Here, taking ‘scientific theories’
to refer only to construals belonging to some empirical science should not be intended, of course,
as implying any philosophical pronouncement to the effect that mathematics or logic or any other
branch of knowledge which is usually considered not empirical (or a priori) is not scientific in
some appropriate sense. We shall merely conform to a current habit, generally adopted within
the discussion about ia, according to which ‘science’ and its cognates are taken to refer only to
empirical disciplines, by considering it as nothing but a convenient terminological stipulation.
Once this is made clear, it is important to notice that from the reading of ‘scientific theory’
suggested above it follows that the parameter ‘P ’ in our schemas is to be replaced with a monadic
predicate designating a property that can be attributed to scientific theories conceived as above.
Claiming that some scientific theories have this property thus comes down to claiming some among
the actual construals widely admitted as being part of an empirical science posses this property.
The existential import of this claim is then quite weak18.
This does not by itself make the claim a weak one. Its strength depends, indeed, on the
property designated by the predicate replacing ‘P ’. Two distinct roads open up here, leading to
two quite different sorts of arguments. This property can either be an ontological property of
scientific theories, that is a property that these theories are supposed to have merely on the basis
of what they say about the empirical world, and how the world actually is (thus independently of
our epistemic attitudes towards these theories); or an epistemic property of these theories, i.e. a
property they are supposed to have because of our epistemic attitude towards them. Arguments we
encounter along the first road will be called ‘ontological’, those we encounter along the second will
be called ‘epistemic’.19. This distinction could be displayed by replacing ‘P ’ in Sc.IA0 respectively
with the less indeterminate parameters ‘PO’ and ‘PE’, which provide two less indeterminate
schematic ia’s: Sc.IAO1 and Sc.IA
E
1 , respectively. The same holds, of course, for Sc.SIA0, from
which Sc.SIAO1 and Sc.SIA
E
1 can respectively derive
20.
17Maddy has further developed her views in [Maddy, 1997] and [Maddy, 2011]
18Some may suppose this import to be stronger when one considers scientific theories at some ideal final stage
of development. Cf. footnote 52 for some remarks on this point.
19This makes the meaning of ‘epistemic’ in ‘epistemic indispensability argument’ broader than that we ascribed
to it in [Panza and Sereni, 2013], ch. 6, and in [Panza and Sereni, 2015]. This will become clear in § 3.6.
20It goes without saying that arguments in which ‘P ’ is replaced by an ontological property are likely to presup-
pose some robust realist understanding of scientific theories as delivering faithful representations of some external
reality in agreement with some experimental practice, while arguments in which ‘P ’ is replaced by an ontological
property may be compatible with weaker conceptions, where scientific theories are conceived, for instance, as
giving reliable descriptions limited to the observable world and/or as allowing for sufficiently reliable predictions
of empirical phenomena.
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A natural candidate for a property featuring in ontological arguments is truth (a theory being
taken to be true if all its consequences are). Other candidates are approximate truth, truth-
likeness, high objective probability, and the like. A natural candidate for a property featuring in
epistemic arguments is being rationally justified. Other candidates are (empirical) confirmation,
corroboration, high subjective probability, and the like.
In order to determine ‘P ’ fully it will not be enough, however, just to choose one of these
properties, since all of them can be, and are, conceived of in different ways: switching from one
conception to another can have dramatic consequences for the soundness of genuine ia’s. For
example, taking some scientific theories to be true on the basis of a disquotational notion of truth
has certainly not the same consequences than taking them to be true on the basis of a conception
of truth as correspondence to an external reality. Again, taking the justification of some scientific
theories to be justification of their truth is different from taking it to be justification of their
successfulness or appropriateness for some given purposes. As a consequence, when one is to pass






1 , to genuine or strengthened ia’s, one must supply a
clarification of the conception embraced.
One could argue that this difficulty could be avoided by eliminating the parameter ‘P ’ from
Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0, and taking the relevant scientific theories to be just “our best scientific
theories”, as it happens in many cases (e.g. both in the “scientific” and the “Quine/Putnam”
indispensability arguments offered by Colyvan, and in Baker’s “enhanced” one: [Colyvan, 2001],
pp. 7 and 11; [Baker, 2009], p. 613). If the final purpose is to get sound genuine ia’s, this move
seems inadequate if it is not also clarified which theories these are or what makes them our best
ones; and if one just wanted to provide a list of these theories, one should also explain what lets
them verify the appropriate instances of premises (ii) and (iii) of Sc.IA0 or of Sc.SIA0, and this
could hardly be done without ascribing to them a property like those that ‘P ’ could be intended
to designate. The same holds if one wishes to spell out the reasons why these theories are our
best ones. For in order to obtain a sound genuine ia, one must thereby show that the relevant
theories verify the appropriate instances of these premises, and this can be so, again, only if those
reasons rely themselves on the fact that these theories have such properties. In both cases, then,
one is led back to the problem of specifying a property that ‘P ’ is intended to designate: the mere
claim that the relevant theories are our best ones cannot but be a shortcut for saying that they
have such a property21.
21Assessment of the virtues of scientific theories is commonly made through an array of properties, such as
simplicity, ontological parsimony, unificatory power, familiarity of principles, fruitfulness, and so on. It is then
plausible to consider a scientific theory to be one of our best insofar as it possesses some or all of these virtues to
some specified degree. Still, the problem in the present context is not just on which of these grounds a scientific
theory is taken to be among our best. Rather, the problem is to consider whether its being among the best entails
that it has, or depends on its having, a certain property. A crude example will clarify the matter here. Suppose we
suggest to enlist a scientific theory among our best merely because of its extreme simplicity. However we evaluate
this choice, it should be clear that this will not be enough for a mathematical theory indispensable to it to be true,
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3.4 Indispensability of What?
Section summary. We discuss possible replacements for parameter ‘Q’ and surveys
alternative possibilities of restricting attention to mathematical Q’s according to dif-
ferent conception of what mathematics could be taken to be in the context of an ia.
We also explore which features of mathematics may be said to be indispensable to
scientific theories in ia, and argue that different options may be reduced to just one
option, that of replacing ‘mathematical Q’s’ by ‘mathematical theories’.
The replacement clauses relative to the remaining parameters involved in Sc.IA0 directly depend
on the meaning to be ascribed to ‘mathematical’, and ‘indispensable’ in premise (ii).
Let us begin with ‘mathematical’. While it is obvious that speaking of mathematical Q’s
allows one to restrict the scope of the arguments, it is by far less obvious how the restriction is
to be conceived. Is mathematics here to be understood as a fixed sphere of (abstract) thoughts,
or as a system of eternal truths, or rather as a human activity taking place in history, or again
as a mutable system of results actually attained? Suppose we take it as a fixed sphere of (ab-
stract) thoughts, or as a system of eternal truths. This may end up making some versions of ia
circular. This is would be the case for those versions whose conclusion were that some mathe-
matical theories, or some mathematical statements are true. For in order to get this conclusion,
one should take mathematical Q’s to be mathematical theories, or mathematical statements, and
the relevant instances of premise (ii) of Sc.IA0 or Sc.SIA0 could, then, be argued for only by
granting that these theories or statements are true (indeed, if this is not granted, under this un-
derstanding of ‘mathematical’ they could not be taken to be mathematical). Moreover, adopting
this understanding of mathematics would confine the purpose of any other version of ia to that
of supporting one particular picture of the relevant sphere of thoughts or system of truths, as
opposed to others (for instance, a picture of the truths of mathematics as eternal truths about
eternal objects, as opposed to purely logical truths lacking any objectual content). Though this
last outcome may be seen as relevant enough, the (original) spirit of ia suggests that it is not what
is expected. It thus seems more judicious to follow the second direction and view mathematics
as a human activity or a mutable system of actual results.
The question is then what feature of this activity or system is to be considered in an ia.
According to premise (ii) of Sc.IA0, such a feature of mathematics will have to be somehow
indispensable to the relevant scientific theories. If this is so, then according to premise (iii) of
Sc.IA0, if these scientific theories have some relevant property P , then some sort of items involved
in this feature of mathematics meet some (philosophically) significant condition. By determining
‘Q’, we fix the relevant feature of mathematics (conceived as above); by determining ‘L’, we fix
or for the objects this latter theory is putatively about to exist. Something more than mere simplicity should be
required for this to obtain.
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the relevant modality of indispensability; by determining ‘a’, we fix the sort of items at issue;
finally, by determining ‘A’, we fix the condition to be met by these items. It is then clear that,
for a genuine ia to be sound, or even for its premises to be at least plausible, the determinations
of all these parameters must all fit together appropriately.
There are several features of mathematics that can be taken into account, many of which are
actually employed in most common formulations: the quantification over mathematical “entities”
or (putative) “objects” (like in [Putnam, 1971]); mathematical entities or objects themselves
(like in [Colyvan, 2001], p. 11, or [Baker, 2005], or many others); the apparent reference to such
entities or objects (like in [Colyvan, 2001], p. 7); the assumption of the truth of some mathematical
statements (like in Resnik “pragmatic” ia: [Resnik, 1995], pp. 169-171; [Resnik, 1997], pp. 46-
48)22; mathematical vocabulary (which we take to be what is often implicitly intended when
authors use ‘apparent reference’)23; or finally, mathematical theories.
These options result from replacing in Sc.IA0 ‘mathematical Q’s’ respectively with: ‘math-
ematical theories’; ‘mathematical quantifications’ (used to designate occurrences of quantifiers
whose range includes mathematical entities or objects); ‘mathematical entities’ or ‘mathematical
(putative) objects’; ‘mathematical terms’ (used to designate singular terms which are supposed
to refer); ‘mathematical constants’ (used to designate constants belonging to a mathematical vo-
cabulary), ‘mathematical putative truths’ (used to designate some mathematical statements held
to be true).
Some may acknowledge significant differences among these six options, and argue that they
may affect the arguments to follow. Against this, in [Panza and Sereni, 2013], pp. 204-205, we
have argued that these are nothing but terminological variants of replacing ‘mathematical Q’s’
with ‘mathematical theories’. A detailed survey of the various options at stake may involve some
lengthy considerations. For the sake of simplicity, we merely assume here that all these options
can be reduced to this latter. In order to support this choice, beside relying on our discussion in
that work, let us observe that there seems to be a common idea underlying these options, i.e. that
22Resnik’s argument is hard to accommodate not only with Sc.IA0 but also with any valid argument schema.
By eliminating a number of logically unessential ingredients, we take it to be as follows:
[Resnik’s pragmatic argument]
i) Some scientific theories are justifiably used (by us).
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical putative truths are indispensable to them.
iii) If some putative truths are indispensable to some scientific theories which are
justifiably used (by us), then these putative truths are to be justifiably
taken to be actually true (by us).
Hence
iv) The mathematical putative truths mentioned in (ii) are to be justifiably taken to be actually
true (by us).
We discussed Resnik’s argument in some more details in [Panza and Sereni, 2015].
23This seems to be the case, for instance, in [Colyvan, 2001], p. 16
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the relevant scientific theories make essential recourse to a vocabulary fixed by some mathematical
theories, and then to the notions that this vocabulary is supposed to convey. Abstracting from
mathematical theories, by focusing either on mathematical entities, mathematical language, or
mathematical statements as such, seems to us to raise the danger of making the argument circular.
For no entity can, in itself, be taken to be indispensable to something in whatever way, if it is not
taken to exist (at least according to the usual conception of existence as a primitive and irreducible
condition that is admitted here, and to the usual supposition that nothing can be so and so if
it does not exist in this sense); and no language or statement can be taken to be meaningful by
itself (that is, independently of some stipulations whose admission would just consist in adopting
a theory having this language as its language) if it is not taken to be able to speak of something
we can have an epistemic access to independently of this very language.
In our opinion, there is then no other appropriate option than basing an ia on the acknowl-
edgment that some mathematical theories (or better, the recourse to them) are (is) somehow
indispensable to some scientific theories. Hence, ‘Q’ is indeterminate only with respect to how
some scientific theories are to be taken to have recourse to some (other) theories. Is it enough,
for example, to borrow part of the vocabulary of these letter theories, or should we rather see
these theories as entirely included within the relevant scientific ones? And, in the former case, is
it enough to borrow some constants included in this language, or should we also require that the
intended semantic of this language, or a relevant part of it, are adopted?
3.5 What is Indispensability?
Section summary. Various possible replacements for parameter ‘L’ are discussed, in
order to throw light on the notion of indispensability. We first consider the case where
a single mathematical theory is said to be indispensable to another single scientific the-
ory. Several examples are offered, and Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument
is discussed. The notion of indispensability is found wanting of various specifications.
We suppose that any theory (either scientific, or mathematical, or of any other sort)
can have different instances (or admit different formulations), and we argue that a
certain theory (either mathematical or not) can appropriately be said to be indis-
pensable for a certain scientific theory only insofar as any instance of the latter must
indispensably have recourse to an instance of the former in order to accomplish a cer-
tain task in an appropriate way. By supposing that a scientific theory can be said to
accomplish a certain (descriptive, predictive, explanatory, etc.) task if it meets some
condition h, and to do that in an appropriate way if it also meets some condition k,
and that accomplishing this task in such an appropriate way is a necessary condition
for this scientific theory to have the property P ascribed to it in the premise (i) of
an ia, we suggest a first definition of indispensability in terms of h and k. Having
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properly introduced the notion of a family of theories, generalizations of this definition
are then considered for application to cases where indispensability relates families of
mathematical theories to families of scientific theories, single mathematical theories to
families of scientific theories, and families of mathematical theories to single scientific
theories.
Let us come now to the replacement clauses for ‘L’. Most of ia’s currently discussed do not address
the need of specifying any particular modality under which the relevant mathematical Q’s are
said to be indispensable to scientific theories (with the relevant exception of Baker’s Enhanced
Indispensability Argument, to which we will come soon24): they just state that the former are
indispensable to the latter. This is quite strange, however, since, when one looks carefully at it,
the very idea of the indispensability of something for scientific theories (conceived as said in §
3.3) is far from clear. Let us try then to explore the matter further.
Up to now, we have spoken of the indispensability of some Q’s (crucially some mathematical
Q’s) for some scientific theories, both in the plural. Odd as this may have seemed, it depended
on our intent to remain open both to the possibility of taking these Q’s and scientific theories
singularly—that is, each of them separately from other Q’s and scientific theories, respectively—,
or altogether, as forming appropriate families of Q’s and scientific theories, respectively.
In order to make this point clearer, let us confine ourselves to the case where the Q’s are
theories (even though what follows could apply, mutatis mutandis, to other options, if considered
to be significantly different)25. The question is then whether ia’s are to be concerned with the
indispensability of single mathematical theories for single scientific theories, or with the indis-
pensability of families of mathematical theories for families of scientific theories, or even with the
indispensability of single mathematical theories for families of scientific theories, or of families of
mathematical theories for single scientific theories26.
24Before Baker’s argument, Colyvan’s discussion of “the role of confirmation theory” (cf. [Colyvan, 2001], pp. 78-
81) displayed awareness that the notion of indispensability may be somehow relational in character. We take our
following discussion to improve on that suggestion. It still remains, however, that whatever relation character
indispensability may be thought to have by Colyvan, it was not displayed in the very formulation of arguments he
discusses, contrary to what happens in Baker’s argument and, more explicitly, in our versions of ia.
25Notice that we leave open how recourse of a scientific theory to a mathematical theory is to be understood.
26In order to avoid confusion, let us make clear from the beginning that we do not take a family of theories as
the mere conjunction of the elements that these theories are formed by, but rather as a system of separate (though
possibly related) theories, each of which is considered as self-standing. If we suppose that theories are nothing but
bodies of statements, the former option would consist in taking families of theories to be in turn theories. The
latter option consists in taking them to be systems of bodies of statements, each of which remains distinct from
each other, even when the family is considered as a whole. Clearly, the latter is the only plausible option if we
want to consider families of theories composed by rival, or even incompatible theories. Moreover, it is only under
this option that it makes sense to distinguish between the case in which ia concerns theories from that in which
it rather concerns families of theories.
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The first option is arguably the most natural one, but the others are suggested by the generic
appeal, in many current ia’s, to the indispensability of the quantification over mathematical
entities, or of mathematical entities tout court, or by the use of expressions like ‘indispensable to
science’ (and also ‘indispensable to our best scientific theories’).
Let us begin by considering this first option27. According to it, in Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0, ‘some
scientific theories’ and (appropriate determinations of) ‘some (mathematical) Q’s’ will respectively
refer to a number of scientific theories and to a number of (mathematical) theories, and each of
the former is considered in virtue of its having recourse to just one of the latter. Consequently, in
∗Sc.IA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0, ‘ScTh’ and ‘Q’ will stand respectively for the properties of being a single
scientific theory and a single (mathematical) theory.
Saying that a certain theory (mathematical or not) is indispensable for a certain scientific
theory seems to us to be just a fac¸on de parler for saying that the latter must indispensably have
recourse to the former if it has to accomplish a certain task in an appropriate way28. Asserting
that a theory T is indispensable to a scientific theory S cannot but mean, therefore, that if T were
missing, or were to be replaced by any other theory T∗, this would result in either maintaining
S unchanged but making it unable to accomplish its relevant task in the appropriate way, or
in transforming S in a different theory S∗ (that could either be able to accomplish its task in
the appropriate way or not). Moreover, in the context of an ia, accomplishing this task in an
appropriate way has to be considered as a necessary condition for this scientific theory to have
the property P ascribed to it in premise (i). As a consequence, if we want to determine what is
meant exactly when we speak of indispensability in the context of ia, we need to get clear on:
i) the identity conditions of the two theories; ii) the task that the scientific theory is supposed
to accomplish; iii) the appropriate way in which it is required to accomplish such task; iv) and,
therefore, the property P that it is supposed to have.
The point is not undermined even by taking T to be indispensable to the mere articulation or
formulation of S. For also in this case it it is hard to see what this could mean in the end, if not
that if T were missing or were to be replaced with any other theory T∗, S would be transformed in
another theory S∗, or it would be made unable to accomplish some relevant task in the appropriate
way.
A well-known example of an ia where at least one of these four aspects is explicitly taken
into account (namely the task that the relevant scientific theories are supposed to accomplish)
is Baker’s “enhanced” argument ([Baker, 2009], p. 613; Baker was partly anticipated in this by
[Field, 1989], pp. 15)29:
27This is the only option we have taken into account in [Panza and Sereni, 2013].
28Cf. footnote 52, below, for the sense in which we are talking of task here.
29 Baker’s argument is meant to be enanched with respect to the argument put forward by [Colyvan, 2001], p.
11:
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[Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument]
i) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an
indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
ii) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science.
Hence
iii) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects.
We take premise (ii) to mean that our best scientific theories would not be able to be as explana-
tory as they are supposed to be, if they did not involve mathematical objects is some way. It still
remains, however, that in order to make this claim completely clear, one should not only explain
what it means that a scientific theory is as explanatory as it is supposed to be, but also: how
it is required to be in order to accomplish this task in an appropriate way; which property it is
supposed to have (for which ‘P ’ stands in Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0) in order for a sound genuine ia
to apply to it; and what it means that it would not remain the same if it did not somehow involve
any mathematical objects.
Baker’s discussion of his argument and his famous examples from the life cycle of periodical ci-
cada (ibid, p. 614) possibly tell us something on the first question. The remaining three questions,
however, seem not to be sufficiently explored. Moreover, Baker’s argument seems concerned, at
least on its face, with the indispensability of mathematical objects in general, and this, at least
on one plausible reading, suggests that he is thinking of the indispensable explanatory role of
the whole family of accepted mathematical theories (granted, of course, that he is not circularly
thinking of the indispensability of mathematical objects considered by themselves, independently
of any theory)30. Far from fully determining the notion of indispensability, Baker’s argument
urges then us to shed light on the different aspects of this notion that stand in need of further
determination.
Suppose we agree that both a certain scientific theory S (conceived as specified in § 3.3) and a
certain other theory T can admit of a number of distinct formulations or ways of presentations—
which we shall respectively call ‘instances of S’ and ‘instances of T’31. Suppose also that we have
fixed a way in which an instance of a scientific theory can possibly have recourse to an instance
[Colyvan’s Indispesability argument]
i) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our
best scientific theories.
ii) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
Hence
iv) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
Baker’s argument is meant to enhance Colyvan’s argument exactly in so far as it makes it explicit that there is a
specific task that scientific theories, and mathematical theories (or, allegedly, objects) indispensable to them, are
meant to accomplish, and that this task is an explanatory one.
30Concerning the circularity of this attitude, cf. section 3.4.
31It is assumed here that we have an ability of recognising canonical instances of the relevant theories. This is
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of another theory. Finally, suppose that an instance of S is taken to accomplish a certain task if
it meets a certain condition h and that it is taken to do it in an appropriate way if it also meets
a certain condition k. We shall say that:
T is h-k-dispensable to S if and only if there is an instance Si of S such that Si meets both the
conditions h and k and has no recourse to any instance of T in the way fixed.
T is h-k-indispensable to S if and only if it is not h-k-dispensable, that is, if and only if for any
instance Si of S which meets both the conditions h and k, there is an instance Ti of T such
that Si has recourse to it in the way fixed.
Imagine, for example, that S has an instance S0, with a certain empirical content, that is deduc-
tively well-balanced—that is, it admits a reasonably small numbers of assumptions stated in a
reasonable simple language from which all its consequences deductively follow, possibly on the
basis of the ascertainment of certain empirical data—, and has recourse to an instance of T in
the way that has been fixed. Let h be the condition of having the same empirical content as S0,
or possibly a wider one, and k be the condition of being deductively well-balanced. Then T is
h-k-dispensable to S if and only if there is an instance Si of S, such that Si has the same empirical
content as S0, or possibly a wider one, is deductively well-balanced, and has no recourse to any
instance of T in the way that has been fixed. T is thus h-k-indispensable to S if and only if for
any instance Si of S which has the same empirical content as S0, or possibly a wider one, and is
deductively well-balanced, there is an instance Ti of T such that Si has recourse to it in the way
that has been fixed.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that T is, as it were, vacuously h-k-indispensable
to any theory S no instance of which meets both the conditions h and k, for in this case the
implication ‘Si meets the conditions h and k ⇒ there is an instance Ti of T such that Si has
recourse to it in the way that has been fixed’ is vacuously true since its antecedent is always false.
One could try to avoid this unpleasant consequence of the definition by amending it in some
appropriate way, for example by restricting its range to scientific theories admitting at least an
instance that meets both the conditions h and k. Nonetheless, if the aim of a clarification of the
notion of indispensability is to discuss the soundness conditions of genuine ia’s, this apparently
obnoxious consequence has no undesirable effects: we have required above that the conditions h
and k and the property P have to be so determined that an instance of a scientific theory S meets
both these conditions only if S is P . It then follows that a theory S no instance of which meets
both conditions is not P and cannot then be involved in a sound genuine ia.
This definition takes the identity conditions of the relevant theories as given in advance, as
well as the conditions for two instances of a theory to count as instances of the same theory. A
more general definition would go as follows.
indeed required if we are to be able to identify these theories in the scientific and mathematical practice in which
they should be immersed, in accordance with what have been said in §§ 3.3 and 3.4.
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are instances of S and T if and only if S′j is equivalent to S0 according to an equivalence relation
σ and T′j is equivalent to T0 according to an equivalence relation τ . Then:
T is h-k-dispensableσ-τ to S if and only if there is an instance S
′
i of a scientific theory that is
σ-equivalent to S0, meets conditions h and k, and has no recourse to any instance of a theory
which is τ -equivalent to T0; T is otherwise h-k-indispensableσ-τ to S.
If we suppose that the way in which a scientific theory has recourse to an instance of another
theory has been determined via a full determination of ‘Q’, then—in the case where Sc.IA0
and Sc.SIA0 concern the indispensability of single theories for single scientific theories—the full
determination of the parameter ‘L’ is obtained via a determination of conditions h and k, in
agreement with the determination of the property P , and of the two equivalence relations σ and
τ (we are considering here the case in which Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0 concern the indispensability of
single theories to single scientific theories).
Assume then that the way in which an instance of a scientific theory can have recourse to an
instance of another theory and the two equivalence relations σ, τ have appropriately been fixed,
and that both the relevant task on which h depends, and the appropriate way of accomplishing
this task on which k depends, have been so determined that a scientific theory cannot accomplish
this task in this way if it is not P . This allows one to speak without further qualification of the
h-k-indispensability of a theory T for a scientific theory S, and of both these theories as being
the same as, or distinct from, some theories T? and S?.
The two following cases can now be considered.
First, suppose that a certain theory T is h-k-indispensable to a certain scientific theory S,
but that there is a distinct scientific theory S? which accomplishes the same relevant task as S
in the appropriate way—that is, as well as S does, or even better—, and which is such that T
is h-k-dispensable to it. This means that there is an instance S?i of S
? that has recourse to no
instance of T in the fixed way and meets conditions h and k. Suppose also that S satisfies premise
(i) of Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0 under an appropriate determination of ‘P ’. This entails that S? is P
too. Should then one say that T is h-k-indispensable to a family of scientific theories including
both S and S?? Our intuition is that one should not32.
This suggests a new definition:
32The former option mentioned in footnote (26) would probably support a different intuition. But under this
option, T would be h-k-indispensable to a family of scientific theories including both S and S? just for its being
h-k-indispensable to S, so that there would be no point in considering S?. Moreover, in the case considered here
it should be possible that S and S? be rival theories; this is compatible with considering a family including both
theories only under the first option of footnote (26). Taking T as h-k-dispensable to a family of scientific theories
including both S and S? expresses thus the idea that having recourse to T is not indispensable for accomplishing
the relevant task in the appropriate way; and this is, of course, all that is relevant in the case considered.
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T is h-k-dispensable to a family S of scientific theories accomplishing the same relevant
task, if S includes a scientific theory to which T is h-k-dispensable (even if it also contains
other scientific theories to which it is h-k-indispensable); T is h-k-indispensable to S if it
is not h-k-dispensable.
By way of example, suppose that, pace Field, real analysis were indispensable to Newton’s
gravitational theory, this latter being regarded as a well-balanced theory making exact predictions
(with an acceptable margin of error) concerning astronomic (and possibly other non-microscopic)
phenomena. One could still argue that the same exact predictions (with the same margin of
error) concerning the same phenomena can also be made by another well-balanced theory which,
by involving no appeal to irrational real numbers (but only, say, to rational ones), would be
essentially distinct from Newton’s gravitational theory. Our intuition here is that one should say
that real analysis is dispensable to well-balanced scientific theories whose aim is to make exact
predictions concerning these phenomena33
Second, suppose that a certain theory T is h-k-dispensable to a scientific theory S, so that
there is an instance Si of S that has no recourse to any instance of T in the fixed way, and meets
conditions h and k. It is still possible that Si has recourse to an instance of another theory T
?
of the same sort of T (for example to another mathematical theory, if T is mathematical), and
that any instance of S which meets these conditions has either recourse to an instance of T or to
an instance of T?. Should then one say that a family of theories of the same sort composed by T
and T? is h-k-dispensable to S? Again, our intuition is that one should not.
This suggests a new definition:
33 The example is well suited for emphasizing the importance of relativizing indispensability as we are suggesting.
For it would be natural to argue that the pervasive use of differential and integral calculus (especially differential
and partial differential equations) in so many scientific theories (not only physical ones) makes real analysis (or
whatever appropriate theory of mathematical continuum) indispensable for these very theories. The point would
be certainly well taken, since no scientific theory akin to classical mechanics, in its usual formulation coming from
Newton, Lagrange, and Hamilton, could, for example, avoid appealing to the differential and integral calculus
without losing its very identity. Still, this form of indispensability is far from supporting appropriate versions of
ia, since appealing to it in order to draw conclusions about mathematics would reduce to arguing that mathematics
is as these conclusions claim it to be because it happened that some scientific theories are just as they happen to
be, which is certainly not what ia is intended to conclude (though one could imagine other essentially different
arguments along this line). Notice, incidentally, that, as convincingly maintained in [Maddy, 1997], ch. II.6, the
use of differential and integral calculus in science goes typically together with the appeal to different sorts of
“idealizations” (cf. also [Maddy, 1992] on idealizations, and [Colyvan, 2001, ch. 5] and [Leng, 2010, ch. 5] for
discussions). And this is enough to undermine the possibility of taking the “indispensable appearance of an entity
in our best scientific theory to warrant the ontological conclusion that it is real”, since “for this conclusion, the
appearance must be in a hypothesis that is not legitimately judged a ‘useful fiction’, in other words, in one that
has been ‘experimentally verified’ [. . . ], and it must be in the context that is not an explicit idealization” (ibid.,
p. 152).
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A family of theories T of a certain sort is h-k-indispensable to a scientific theory S if any
instance of S which meets both h and k: (i) has recourse to an instance of either one or
another among the theories in T , (ii) for every theory T in T there is an instance of S
that has recourse to at least an instance of T; T is of course h-k-dispensable to S if it is
not h-k-indispensable to it.
To borrow an example from Molinini’s contribution to this volume (cf. [Molinini, 2015]),
special relativity may admit both a well-balanced instance offering good explanations of the
Lorentz-contractions having recourse to ZF set-theory considered on its own, and a well-balanced
instance offering the same good explanation having recourse to Minkowsky’s geometry (taken as a
primitive mathematical theory, unreduced to ZF); and it may be the case that all of its instances
has recourse to either of these two theories and to no other mathematical theory. According
to our definitions, a family of mathematical theories composed by ZF (considered on its own),
and Minkowsky geometry (taken as primitive), is indispensable to special relativity regarded as
a well-balanced theory able to provide a good explanation of the Lorentz-contractions (although
neither ZF not Minkowsky geometry, individually taken, are so).
These two latter definitions finally suggest another definition:
A family T of theories of a certain sort is h-k-indispensable to a family S of scientific
theories if for any theory S in S , there is a subfamily of T that is indispensable to S, and
any theory of T is included in a subfamily of it that is indispensable to a theory of S ; T
is h-k-dispensable from S if it is not h-k-indispensable to S .
The previous definitions, together with what we said about the replacement clauses for pa-
rameters ‘P ’ and ‘Q’, should be enough for clarifying what has to be determined in order for
premises (i) and (ii) of Sc.IA0, and Sc.SIA0 to be transformed in genuine non-schematic state-
ments with a definite truth-value. One thing to do is to decide whether the indispensability
relation involved in premise (ii) relates single theories to single theories or families of theories to
families of theories, or even a single theory to a family of theories or a family of theories to a single
theory. This has, of course, a consequence on the exact meaning to be ascribed to the expression
‘some scientific theories’ and ‘some Q’s’ in both argument schemas34, and then on the meaning
of the corresponding existential assumptions. In other words, one has to decide whether ‘some
scientific theories’ and ‘some (mathematical) Q’s’ in Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0 are to refer respectively
to a number of scientific theories and to a number of (mathematical) theories each of which is
individually considered, or else to a family of scientific theories and to a family of (mathematical)
theories35.
34And thus also on the exact meaning to be ascribed to the predicate ‘ScTh’ and ‘Q’ in ∗Sc.IA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0.
35And thus whether ‘ScTh’ and ‘Q’ in ∗Sc.IA0 and ∗Sc.SIA0 are to stand respectively for the properties of being
a single scientific theory and a single (mathematical) theory, or for the properties of being a family of scientific
theory and a family of (mathematical) theories.
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Making a choice or another can have dramatic consequences on the truth conditions of in-
stances of premises (ii) and (iii)36. For example, if we assume that the indispensability relation
relates either a single theory or a family of theories to a family of scientific theories, and the latter
family is taken to be composed by the totality of scientific theories widely accepted within the
scientific community—a quite natural understanding of the common expression ‘our best scientific
theories’—, it is all but clear that there will be true instances of premise (ii) (however the deter-
mination of ‘L’, the way a scientific theory is taken to possibly have recourse to a mathematical
one, and the relevant family of mathematical theories are determined). Analogously, if we assume
that the indispensability relation relates a family of theories either to a single scientific theory or
to a family of scientific theories, and the former family is taken to be composed by the totality
of mathematical theories widely accepted within the mathematical community, it is clear that
no instance of this premise will be true. A fortiori, this is also the case if the indispensability
relation is taken to relate a family of theories to a family of scientific theories, and the former is
taken to be composed by the totality of mathematical theories widely accepted within the math-
ematical community and the latter by the totality of scientific theories widely accepted within
the scientific community. In other terms, any instance of premise (ii) seems to be untrue if it is
respectively taken to assert that mathematics as a whole is L-indispensable to science as a whole,
or that mathematics as a whole is L-indispensable to a part of science; and it is all but clear
that there will be true instances of premise (ii) if it is taken to assert that part of mathematics
is L-indispensable to science as a whole37.
On the other hand, it will become clear in § 3.6 that if we take the indispensability relation to
relate a family of theories either to a single scientific theory or to a family of scientific theories,
it becomes quite hard to get instances of premise (iii) which are true38.
3.6 Ia’s for Platonism, Veridicalism, and Externality
Section summary. Suitable replacements for parameters ‘a’ and ‘A’ are discussed.
Main examples of replacements for ‘a’ are ‘(putative) objects’ and ‘theorems’. Re-
36For premise (i), things seem to be simpler, since it is reasonable to admit that a family of scientific theories
is P if and only if any theory of this family is individually P (the underlying thought being that those properties
for which this would not be the case would not be allowed for as possible replacements for ‘P ’).
37Also in the cases just considered the first option mentioned in footnote (26) would probably suggest a different
intuition. But, then, a family of theories would be L-indispensable to a family of scientific theories, or a theory
to a family of scientific theories, or a family of theories to a scientific theory, just in case this were the case for
one theory of the former family and one theory of the latter. Hence, for example, mathematics as a whole would
be L-indispensable to a science as a whole, just in case that a mathematical theory were so for a scientific theory;
but then it would somehow be misleading to speak of science and mathematics as wholes, rather than speaking of
specific theories
38See, however, remarks at pages 38-39, below.
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placements of ‘A’ are then discussed for each of these replacements of ‘a’ in both
ontological and epistemic schematic ia, according to possible replacements of the al-
ready partially specified parameters ‘PO’ and ‘PE’ (cf. Section 3.3). Four argument
schemas are singled out through further specifications: ontological ia’s for platonism;
epistemic ia’s for platonism; ontological ia’s for veridicalism; epistemic ia’s for ex-
ternality. Externality is here understood as the thesis that the relevant statements
or theorems are externally justified, and external justification, as opposed to internal
justification, is understood as a justification for statements that is not exhausted by
consequences of a given theory (internal and external truth are also clarified along
similar lines). Finally, two other argument schemas are acknowledged as ‘mixed ia for
platonism’ and ‘mixed ia for externality’. It is also observed that each of the foregoing
six argument schemas can be given for strengthened ia’s too.
The last step in getting a genuine ia is the full determination of the parameters ‘a’ and ‘A’.
Let us begin with the former. At the best of our knowledge, all available versions of ia
result from taking ‘a’ to be replaced either with ‘entities’ or ‘objects’, clearly understood as
denoting putative objects—as it happens in all examples mentioned up to now, except for Resnik’s
“pragmatic” ia—, or with ‘theorems’, ‘consequences’, ‘statements’, or ‘truths’, clearly understood
as denoting putative truths—as it happens in Resnik’s argument39.
Hence, if one takes Q’s to be theories, as we suggested in § 3.4, their a’s will respectively be
either the entities or objects which these theories are putatively about or they putatively fix, or
as the consequences (i.e. the theorems) of these theories.
If one follows instead one of the other options mentioned in § 3.4—thus suggesting significant
differences with the one we adopted—, things will have to be specified case by case40.
Once the replacements clauses for ‘a’ have been fixed, those for ‘A’ depend on them and on
whether ‘A’ occurs either in an ontological schematic ia or in an epistemic schematic ia’s. Four
different options arise: ‘A’ is to be determined (1) in an ontological schematic ia in which ‘a’
39Cf. footnote 22, above.
40If ‘a’ is replaced with ‘entities’ or ‘(putative) objects’, then: the a’s of the relevant quantifications will be the
entities or putative objects that the corresponding quantifiers range on; the a’s of the relevant entities or putative
objects will be these very entities or putative objects; the a’s of the relevant terms will be the entities or putative
objects that these terms putatively refer to; the a’s of the relevant constants will be the entities or putative objects
that these constants are used to speak of (either by putatively referring to them, or by designating some properties
of, or relation among them, or some functions defined on them); finally, the a’s of the relevant putative truths will
be the entities or putative objects of which these putative truths are supposed to be true. If ‘a’ is replaced with
‘statements’ or ‘consequences’, then: the a’s of the relevant quantifications will be the corresponding quantified
statements; the a’s of the relevant entities or putative putative objects will be the relevant statements concerning
these entities or putative objects; the a’s of the relevant terms will be the relevant statements involving these
terms; the a’s of the relevant constants will be the relevant statements involving these constants; finally, the a’s of
the relevant putative truths will be these very putative truths.
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is replaced with ‘entities’ or ‘(putative) objects’; (2) in an ontological schematic ia in which ‘a’
is replaced with ‘statements’ or ‘consequences’; (3) in an epistemic schematic ia in which ‘a’ is
replaced with ‘entities’ or ‘(putative) objects’; (4) in an epistemic schematic ia in which ‘a’ is
replaced with ‘statements’ or ‘consequences’. These four different sorts of schematic ia’s can hope
to deliver genuine sound ia’s only if ‘A’ is determined in each of them in an appropriate way.
In case (1) ‘A’ has to stand for a condition that appropriate entities or objects putatively meet
independently of our epistemic relation with the scientific theories which indispensably appeal to
them in same way (if any). In case (2),‘A’ has to stand for a condition that the consequences
of a theory, or some appropriated statements, putatively meet, again independently of such an
epistemic relation. In case (3) ‘A’ has to stand for a condition that appropriate entities or objects
putatively meet because of such an epistemic relation. Finally, in case (4) ‘A’ has to stand for
a condition that the consequences of a theory, or some appropriate statements, again putatively
meet because of such an epistemic relation.
Let us consider cases (2) and (4). In these cases the natural choice seems to take ‘A’ to
stand for truth in ontological schematic ia’s, or for rational justification in epistemic schematic
ia’s. Still, one should not take for granted that ‘true’ and ‘justified’ means the same when
applied, respectively, to scientific theories and to statements that may be somehow indispensably
involved in scientific theories (e.g. to consequences of other theories that may be indispensable to
scientific theories). Once more, their meaning will be a matter of the determination of the other
intermediate parameters involved in Sc.IA0, and Sc.SIA0.
In order to make this clear, let us then distinguish truth and justification as putative properties
of scientific theories from ϑ-truth and ϑ-justification as putative properties of statements that may
be somehow indispensably involved in scientific theories.
Notice that ϑ-justification of the consequence of some theories must in any case be something
else than just the property of being appropriately obtained within the theory (e.g. proven in it, if
the theory is a mathematical one): this would be tantamount to say that they are what they are,
namely consequences of the relevant theories. Their being ϑ-justified should rather depend on our
having some rational reasons to attribute some additional virtue to them (for example, reasons
for taking them to be true, according to a conception of truth for which truth does not coincide
merely with being appropriately derived within a theory). In order to help ourselves with some
ready-to-use terminology, when the justification of a certain statement depends on attributing to
it a virtue that is not exhausted by its being consequence of a given theory, we shall then say that
its justification is external (and internal otherwise). Our present point can thus be expressed by
saying that ϑ-justification is an external justification.41.
41The adjectives ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are reminiscent of other well-known debates. They are reminiscent of
the distinction between internalism and externalism about knowledge and justification in epistemology; and they
are reminiscent of the distinction between internal and external ontological questions as advanced in [Carnap, 1950].
Although similiarities between our use of these expressions and their use in these other debates may be suggested,
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Something similar has also to hold for ϑ-truth. This cannot reduce to anything like internal
truth, i.e. truth so conceived that a statement is true just insofar as it is a consequence of a
certain theory. Whatever it might be, ϑ-truth must agree with an external notion of truth, i.e.
truth depending on some sort of correspondence with an independent reality.
In cases (2) and (4), it seems then quite natural that ‘A’ should stand for ϑ-truth and ϑ-
justification, in ontological and epistemic ia’s respectively, whatever property ‘PO’ and ‘PE’
might stand for. Suppose, for example, that ‘PO’ and ‘PE’ stand respectively for approximate
truth, truth-likeness, high objective probability, or the like, and for (empirical) confirmation,
corroboration, high subjective probability, or the like. Should one maintain that if some scientific
theories have one of these properties, then the mathematical statements somehow indispensably
involved in them (if any) inherit this same property? This would surely contrast with the widely
accepted idea that mathematics is neither imprecise nor contingent. We should thus reject this
option42. Nonetheless we can still maintain that truth or rational justification of some scientific
theories is inherited by the mathematical statements somehow indispensably involved in these
scientific theories (if any). What could at best be claimed here, is that the truth—or, a fortiori,
the approximate truth, truth-likeness, high objective probability, or the like—of these scientific
theories entail some sort of rational justification of these mathematical statements, rather than
truth.
In cases (1) and (3), the natural choice seems rather to take ‘A’ to stand for existence, for
ontological schematic ia’s, and for justifiably ascribed existence (i.e. the condition that something
meets if we are rationally justified in taking it to exist), for epistemic ia’s. In both cases, for
analogous reasons, existence is to be understood as external existence, in the sense suggested
above43. Once more, this is independent of the property that ‘PO’ and ‘PE’ stand for. The reason
is similar to that considered above for cases (2) and (4). When their existence is concerned, taking
mathematical entities or putative objects to be susceptible of any property respectively distinct
from, and lees robust than, existence itself or justifiably ascribed existence (e.g. approximate
existence, existence-likeness, high objective probability of existence, and the like; and confirmed
ascribed existence, corroborated ascribed existence, high subjective probability of existence, and
the like) seems to contrast with a widely accepted conception of mathematics. And again, using
forms of ia in order to ascribe one of these properties to mathematical entities or putative objects,
and may have driven us in choosing them, our terminology should merely be understood here as technical jargon
with no other meaning than the one we have explained.
42This is in no way an argument against the possibility of endorsing ia in a different setting, where mathematics
is rather conceived as imprecise and/or contingent as empirical sciences. We have no intention to argue against
such an approach. We rather confine ourselves to considering more traditional and usual forms of ia, where ‘A’
may stand either for ϑ-truth or for ϑ-justification. We shall just take it that what we shall say in the rest of this
paper about these forms of ia also applies, mutatis mutandis, to other forms, agreeing with this alternative setting.
43In what follows we shall take the verb ‘to exist’ and its cognates in their external sense, as appears to be
customary in the debate on ia.
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on the ground that some scientific theories somehow indispensably appeal to them, seems to
contrast with the spirit of ia. As with cases (2) and (4) above, one could at most concede that
the truth—or, a fortiori, the approximate truth, truth-likeness, high objective probability or the
like—of the relevant scientific theories can at best entail the justifiably ascribed existence of these
entities of putative objects, rather than their actual existence44
We take, then, the conclusions of ia’s relative to cases (1) to (4) to be respectively that:
(C1) the relevant mathematical entities or putative objects exist; (C2) the relevant mathematical
entities or putative objects may be justifiably taken to exist, that is, we are justified in taking
them to exist; (C3) the relevant mathematical statements or theorems are ϑ-true (that is, they are
true in an appropriate, external sense); (C4) the relevant mathematical statements or theorems
are ϑ-justified (that is, they are justified in an appropriate, external sense).
It is important to notice that arguing that ϑ-justification has to be an external justification
is not the same as requiring that it be justification for external truth (that is, justification for us
to believe that the relevant statements are true). This can be seen quite naturally as an external
justification, but it is not the only sort of external justification conceivable. For instance, one
could say that some statements are externally justified if they are consequences of a theory that
is in turn itself justified45; or else, one can say that they are externally justified if they are useful
for some external task (that is, some task not merely involved in the internal development of a
theory of which they are consequences). This suggests that an epistemic ia in which ‘a’ is replaced
with ‘statements’ or ‘consequences’ is not necessarily an epistemic argument for veridicalism (cf.
page 4, above): its conclusion could be that the relevant mathematical statements are externally
justified without this justification being a justification for their truth. This sort of epistemic ia
should more generally be considered as an argument in favor of what we will here call ‘epistemic
externality’, i.e. the thesis (not to be confused with ‘externalism’ as used in the epistemological
debate) that those statements are externally justified.
We have then the following four sorts of ia’s: ontological ia’s for platonism; epistemic ia’s
for platonism; ontological ia’s for veridicalism; epistemic ia’s for externality (a particular case of
which will be given by an epistemic ia for veridicalism). By making the respective replacements in
Sc.IAO1 and Sc.IA
E
1 , we get the following four arguments schemas, which respectively correspond
to these four sorts of ia’s:
Sc.IAO,P2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
O’, ‘a’ indifferently with ‘entities’ or
with ‘putative objects’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘exist’.
44Again, this is no argument against the possibility of endorsing ia in a different setting. Far for excluding this
possibility, we merely confine ourselves to consider more traditional and usual forms of ia, where ‘A’ may stand
either for existence, or for justifiably ascribed existence, and we take it that what we shall say about these forms
of ia also applies, mutatis mutandis, to other forms, agreeing with this alternative setting.
45This will become clearer in § 4.1
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Sc.IAE,P2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
E’, ‘a’ indifferently with ‘entities’ or
with ‘putative objects’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are to be justifiably taken to exist’.
Sc.IAO,V2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
O’, ‘a’ with ‘statements’ or ‘conse-
quences’, according to the determination of ‘Q’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are ϑ-
true’.
Sc.IAE,Ext2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
E’, ‘a’ with ‘statements’ or ‘con-
sequences’, according to the determination of ‘Q’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are
ϑ-justified’.
For each of these arguments schemas, one can get, then, another argument schema, by making








The fact that from the truth of the relevant scientific theories what can at best follow is
either some sort of justification of the relevant statements or consequences, or the justifiably
ascribed existence of the relevant entities or putative objects, suggests then two other possible
argument schemas, which we shall call, respectively, ‘mixed ia’s for platonism’ and ‘mixed ia’s
for externality’, namely:
Sc.IAM,P2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
O’, ‘a’ indifferently with ‘entities’ or
with ‘putative objects’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are to be justifiably taken to exist’.
Sc.IAM,Ext2 , obtained from Sc.IA0 by replacing ‘P ’ with ‘P
O’, ‘a’ with ‘statements’ or ‘con-
sequences’, according to the determination of ‘Q’, and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are
ϑ-justified’.
Again, for each of these arguments schemas one can obtain another argument schema, by making




One gets then, in total, six schematic ia’s from Sc.IA0 and six schematic strengthened ia’s
from Sc.SIA0, obtained by partially determining the parameters ‘P ’, ‘a’ and ‘A’. We say ‘partially
determining’ also with respect to ‘a’ and ‘A’ since the replacements that have been suggested for
them do not still succeed in fully determining them, except, perhaps, in the case where ‘a’ is
replaced with ‘consequences’ and ‘Q’ with ‘theories’. This should already be clear from what
has been said about ϑ-truth and ϑ-justification. But also speaking of the putative objects of a
certain theory, and, even worst, of their existence (even granted that this has to be understood
externally), is, for example, far from being free from ambiguity. Hence, in order to pass from
these twelve schematic arguments to genuine arguments, one has much more to do than fully
determining the parameters ‘PO’ or ‘PE’ and ‘Q’ and ‘L’.
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But there is more than this. One could argue that, though possibly true, the premises (iii) of









2 —stand in need of a rationale: why is it the case that from the truth of
the relevant scientific theories (or, a fortiori, from their approximate truth, truth-likeness, high
objective probability or the like), or from their being rationally justified (or, a fortiori, from
their confirmation, corroboration, high subjective probability or the like), together with the fact
that some Q’s involving some entities or putative objects are indispensable to these theories,
the existence, or the justifiably ascribed existence of these entities or putative objects should
respectively follow? And, even worst, why should the inverse implication hold too?
To answer this question, consider the case where Q’s are theories. One could split these
premises in two as follows:
[Sc.IAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.i) If some theories are L-indispensable to some scientific theories
which are P , then they are R46.
[Sc.IAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.ii) If some theory are R, then their putative objects meet the
condition Aex47.
or
[Sc.SIAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.i) Some theories are L-indispensable to some scientific theories
which are P if and only if they are R48.
[Sc.SIAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.ii) Some theories are R if and only if their putative objects
meet the condition Aex49,
where ‘R’ is to be replaced with ‘ϑ-true’ or ‘ϑ-justified’ (assuming of course that a theory is
‘ϑ-true’ or ‘ϑ-justified’ if and only if its consequences are) and ‘meet the condition Aex’ is to be
replaced with ‘exist’ or ‘are to be justifiably taken to exist’ if ‘P ’ is is replaced with ‘PO’, and ‘R’
is to be replaced with ‘ϑ-justified’ and ‘meet the condition Aex’ with ‘are to be justifiably taken
to exist’ if ‘P ’, if ‘P ’ is replaced with ‘PE’50.









2 , without changing their respective conclusions. What may be
changing in these variants are the conditions for soundness of the instances of these schemas, since
46In first-order language: [∗Sc.IAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.i) ∀y [Th (y)⇒ [∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x) ∧ L-Ind (y, x)]⇒ R (y)]]
47In first-order language: [∗Sc.IAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.ii) ∀y [Th (y)⇒ [R (y)⇒ Aex (ay)]]
48In first-order language: [∗Sc.SIAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.i) ∀y [Th (y)⇒ [∃x [ScTh (x) ∧ P (x) ∧ L-Ind (y, x)]⇔ R (y)]]
49In first-order language: [∗Sc.SIAO/E/M,P2 ] iii.ii) ∀y [Th (y)⇒ [R (y)⇔ Aex (ay)]]
50If Q’s are not taken to be theories, the forms of these premises have to be slightly changed, but it should not
be difficult to see how this could be done in other cases.
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it is possible that the instances of their premises (iii) be true despite the corresponding instances
of the two premises in which these are split are not both true. Insofar as the conditions (iii.i) come
to coincide with the conditions (iii) of the schematic arguments for veridicalism or externality—











sible additional problem raised by the adoption of these variants for the soundness of genuine
ia’s concerns their premises (iii.ii), which, in case of strengthened arguments, green appear quite
openly controversial.
4 Genuine ia’s
Section summary. In this section we offer evidence in support of the claim that no
genuine sound ia has been yet delivered, and that such a (non-vacuously and non-
circularly) sound argument could hardly be found.
From what has been said so far it is clear that from Sc.IA0 and Sc.SIA0 it is possible to get a large
variety of schematic ia’s. In order to get genuine arguments from these, one should offer so many
subtle specifications that there is no hope of providing a complete inventory. This is not necessary,
however. It would be enough to show that some (non-vacuously and non-circularly) sound genuine
arguments (possibly at least one for platonism and one for veridicalism or externality) can be
given, or else that no such argument can. We want now to offer some tentative evidence for the
latter conclusion. We cannot exclude in principle that such genuine arguments can be offered.
Nonetheless, it will be a burden of those who don’t think our conclusion is correct green to come
up with such an argument, by providing all the required determinations and by arguing for the
truth of the premises thus obtained.
4.1 Strengthened ia’s, again
Section summary. We express doubts that a genuine sound strenghtened ia can be
obtained. In order to show this, we consider different specifications of the only-if
implication of Sc.SIA0.iii, according to different specification of the condition A,
in: both epistemic and mixed strengthened ia for externality; epistemic and mixed
strengthened ia for platonism; ontological strengthened ia for both platonism and
veridicalism.
Let us begin with strengthened ia’s. Each of them differs from a corresponding proper ia’s by
including among its premises an implication that the latter lacks, namely an instance of the only-if
implication of [Sc.SIA0].iii. No strengthened genuine ia can then be sound if no proper genuine
ia is so. But even assuming that a sound proper genuine ia is available, a strengthened genuine
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ia could still be unsound if the relevant instance of this supplementary implication is untrue. Let
us then focus on this implication for the time being.
Replace ‘Q’s’ with ‘theories’, ‘the a’s of some Q’s’ with ‘the consequences of some theories’,
and ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are ϑ-justified’. One obtains an instance of this implication
that is suitable for occurring in either an epistemic or a mixed strengthened ia for externality.
Consider the former option, so as to get the following schema:
[Sc.SIAE,Ext2 ] iii.⇐) The consequences of some theories are ϑ-justified only if such
theories are L-indispensable to some scientific theories which
are PE.
We have already observed that ϑ-justification has to be an external property of the conse-
quences of the relevant theories. This implication shows a further reason for this: if this were not
the case, it would be enough to admit that there are some theories that are not L-indispensable
to some scientific theories that are PE to conclude that the implication is untrue. The problem is
then whether one can point to an external property of the consequences of a given theory which
is suitable for satisfying Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii.⇐.
One could take it that the very fact that the relevant theories are L-indispensable to some
scientific theories that are PE is sufficient to bestow a specific external virtue to their consequences.
If one took ϑ-justification to be such a virtue, Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii. ⇐ would be vacuously true, and
this would also be the case of the inverse implication. Hence, any genuine strengthened ia whose
third premise were an instance of Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii.⇐ coupled with the inverse implication, would
be vacuously sound, at best.
To get a non-vacuously sound argument, one should look for another external virtue of conse-
quences of a given theory: a virtue distinct from their merely being consequences of the relevant
kind of theory. But, for both an instance of Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii. ⇐ and the inverse implication to
be true, that virtue should be just intensionally, and not extensionally, different from their being
such consequences. To put it fully explicitly: in order to get a non-vacuously sound genuine
strengthened ia involving an instance of Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii. ⇐, one should find a property that
could be suitably taken as ϑ-justification, that could be possibly ascribed to consequences of a
certain theory, and that is intensionally distinct from, although extensionally coincident with, the
property of being the consequence of a theory that is L-indispensable to some scientific theories
that are PE.
Here we only want to suggest that this will be quite a difficult task. One could retort that
naturalists can easily have such a property at their disposal. We maintain that this is not so.
For present purposes, a naturalist is someone who maintains the thesis that the only form of
justification that can legitimately be ascribed to a statement depends on its being a consequence
of an accepted scientific theory or of a theory that is indispensable (in some appropriate way) to an
accepted scientific theory. Now, if this view had to be relevant to the case at issue, acceptance of
a scientific theory should depend on its having the property ‘PE’ stands for, and the appropriate
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way in which a theory would be indispensable to a scientific theory should be the very way
expressed by an appropriate determination of ‘L’. Hence, naturalism reduces here to focusing on
an epistemic virtue of scientific theories, and arguing that any single statement can be justified
only if it is a consequence either of a scientific theory that has this epistemic virtue, or of a theory
that is L-indispensable to some such scientific theories. Let us notice that this thesis is at least
controversial, and that many may find it in conflict with current practice in mathematics, provided
that the notions of scientific and mathematical theory and of their acceptance and justification
be understood as suggested in §§ 3.3 and 3.4. But this is not our main point here. Rather, the
point is that this thesis gives no hint for providing an instance of Sc.SIAE,Ext2 .iii.⇐ that would
make it and the inverse implication non-vacuously true. Accepting it, can at most lead to a
sound genuine epistemic ia for externality whose conclusion is that some mathematical theorems
acquire the sort of justification that comes to them from their being theorems of theories which
are appropriately indispensable to some accepted scientific theories, and that this is so for the
theorems of all the mathematical theories which are appropriately indispensable to some accepted
scientific theories and only for them. Whereas the former claim in this conclusion is nothing but
a replica of the second premise of the argument (with the only terminological addition consisting
in calling ‘justification’ the relevant virtue), the latter is vacuously true.
The situation does not essentially change when one passes from Sc.SIAE,Ext2 iii. ⇐ to the
corresponding implications involved, respectively, in a mixed strengthened ia for externality and
in an epistemic or mixed strengthened ia for platonism, that is:
[Sc.SIAM,Ext2 ] iii.⇐) The consequences of some theories are ϑ-justified only if such
theories are L-indispensable to some scientific theories which
are P 0.
and
[Sc.SIAE/M,P2 ] iii.⇐) The putative objects of some theories are to be justifiably taken
to exist only if such theories are L-indispensable to some
scientific theories which are PE / PO.
The reason is that the foregoing considerations essentially depend on the way the justification of
the a’s of some theories is to be understood, regardless of whether this is taken to be external
justification of statements or (external) justification of the ascribed existence of putative objects,
and the relevant scientific theories are taken to have an epistemic or an ontological property.
Things seem to change significantly, instead, for those instances of Sc.SIAE,Ext2 iii.⇐ that are
involved in ontological strengthened ia’s both for platonism and for veridicalism, that is:
[Sc.SIAO,P/V2 ] iii.⇐) The putative objects/consequences of some theories exist/are
ϑ-true if and only if such theories are L-indispensable to some
scientific theories which are PO.
Of course, if, in the case of ontological strengthened ia’s for veridicalism, one took ϑ-truth to
be a property that the relevant statements have just for their being consequences of theories that
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are L-indispensable to some scientific theories which are PO, one would fall, mutatis mutandis,
into a vacuity problem analogous to the one previously seen for epistemic and mixed strengthened
ia’s. But, if this option is discarded and existence and ϑ-truth are both taken to be conditions
that putative objects and statements respectively meet or do not meet just on the basis of the
way things actually are in the external world (which would result in identifying ϑ-truth with the
form of truth ascribed to the relevant scientific theories in premise (i) and (ii)), another problem
arises, which is even worse than this.
For it would then be hard to accept that the fact that the relevant theories are somehow
indispensable to some scientific theories having some ontological property be a necessary condition
for the putative objects of the former theories to exist, or for their consequences to be ϑ-true,
provided these scientific theories are conceived as said in § 3.3. The reason is simply that the
nature of these theories essentially depends on the contingency of the human activity that led to
them. Accepting this would therefore be tantamount to claiming that from the fact that some
putative objects or some statements meet a condition that they are supposed to meet or not to
meet just in virtue of the way things actually are in the external world, it follows that these
theories could not in fact be different from what they are like contingently, because of human
activity51. Arguably, any instance of Sc.SIAO,P/V2 .iii.⇐ could not be true, then.
It may be possible that other ways of understanding existence and ϑ-truth would avoid these
and other problems. But the burden of proof in offering such alternative conceptions would be
on those willing to support ontological strengthened ia’s either for platonism or for veridicalism.
Insofar as what we have said in the present section applies to any instance of Sc.SIA0 in which
‘Q’s’ stands for ‘theories’, regardless of the way indispensability and ontological or epistemic
properties of scientific theories are conceived, and any other determination of ‘Q’ seems to us to
be nothing but a terminological variants of this, good evidence seems to have been provided that
no strengthened ia’s is non-vacuously sound.
51Clearly, most of the mathematical theories that we currently take to be indispensable to our scientific theories
would not have been such before the 17th century, and it is absurd to think that the putative objects or statements
corresponding to these mathematical theories would not have met the relevant condition then, but now do. It
is easy to generalize this line of reasoning: as the well-know argument of the pessimistic meta-induction on
scientific theories suggests (cf. [Laudan, 1981]), what we now take to be our best scientific theories are inductively
much more likely to be false than true. One could, perhaps, envisage something as absolute indispensability,
or indispensability in principle, depending on some final stage of scientific development, where all scientific and
mathematical theories will be available at their ultimate level of precision and perfection. Taking this sort of
indispensability to be necessary for the existence of mathematical objects or for ϑ-true of mathematical statement
may not be so implausible as such. But this very notion of indispensability in principle will be highly implausible
as an ingredient of ia, and contrary to how we have suggested scientific and mathematical theories should be
understood to be faithful to the spirit of the argument.
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4.2 Indispensability, again
Section summary. We explore how, in looking for sound genuine ia’s, one can seek
to obtain proper specifications of premises (ii) and (iii) according to different deter-
minations of L-indispensability and conditions h and k (cf. § 3.5, above). As regards
condition k, we settle on the condition of (a theory) being deductively well-balanced
(cf. § 3.5). As regards condition h, we distinguish between descriptive, predictive,
and explanatory tasks. These specifications deliver three modalities of indispensabil-
ity: Dβ-indispensability’, ‘Pβ-indispensability’, and ‘Sβ-indispensability’. These are
discussed in turn in the following subsections.
Consider now genuine proper ia’s, and let us admit again that ‘Q’s’ is replaced in Sc.IA0 by
‘theories’.
In § 3.5, we have already noticed that any instance of premise Sc.IA0.ii seems to be untrue
if it is respectively taken to assert that mathematics as a whole is L-indispensable to science as
a whole, or that mathematics as a whole is L-indispensable to a part of science, and that it is
all but clear that there will be true instances of this premise if it is taken to assert that part of
mathematics is L-indispensable to science as a whole. Hence, if a genuine ia hopes to be sound,
it seems that a choice among scientific and mathematical theories has to be done. Still, in order
for such an argument to be sound, not only its premise (ii), but also its premise (iii) has to be
true. So the relevant questions concerning a genuine ia in which the place of the Q’s is taken
by theories are the following: is there a scientific theory, in the sense specified in § 3.3, or a
particular family of scientific theories accomplishing the same relevant task, for which a certain
mathematical theory or a particular family of mathematical theories is somehow indispensable?
Are these scientific and mathematical theories or families of theories such that they verify premise
(iii) of such a genuine ia?
Answers to both questions depend on how indispensability is specified according to conditions
h and k, from whose determination the determination of ‘L’ in turn depends.
As regards condition k, let us suppose we settled for the condition of being deductively well-
balanced (in the sense explained in § 3.5). Let us also suppose that all the scientific theories and/or
their version we shall consider in what follows are deductively well-balanced. As regards condition
h, consider three distinct possibilities (by far the most common ones in the discussion about ia’s):
suppose that this condition is either that of accomplishing a descriptive task, or a predictive task,
or, finally, an explanatory task, all these tasks being conceived as part of an enquiry resulting from
some sort of empirical experimental practice52. For short, call respectively ‘Dβ-indispensability’,
52It is not at all our intention to suggest that the relevant tasks are practical in nature, or limited to some
pragmatic purposes. Descriptive tasks may, for example, well be identifed with the task of delivering a literally
true description of some external reality. IAlso in this regard, one could evoke the notion of indispensability in
principle mentioned in footnote 51 above. Even if some plausibility were given to this notion, however, appealing
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‘Pβ-indispensability’, and ‘Sβ-indispensability’ the three distinct modalities of indispensability
relative to these sorts of tasks, and to the condition of being deductively well-balanced. So,
concerning premise (ii), the relevant question is the following: is there a scientific theory or
a particular family of scientific theories all accomplishing the same descriptive, predictive, or
explanatory task, for which a certain mathematical theory or a particular family of mathematical
theories are respectively Dβ-indispensable, Pβ-indispensable, or Sβ-indispensable?
4.2.1 Descriptive and Predictive Indispensability
Section summary. We discuss Dβ-indispensability and Pβ-indispensability with ref-
erence to arithmetic, real analysis, and set theory. Also by exploiting the distinc-
tion introduced in § 3.5 between single theories and families of theories, we suggest
that instances of (non-vacuoulsy and non circularly) sound genuine ia involving these
mathematical theories can hardly be found.
Philosophical enquiries about the ontology and semantic of mathematics are most commonly con-
cerned with arithmetic, real analysis, and set theory. So, in considering Dβ-indispensability and
Pβ-indispensability, let us limit our discussion these three theories or branches or mathematics
53.
One first remark is this: if set theory is conceived as a framework in which other parts of
mathematics can possibly be recast, so that any theorem of these parts of mathematics can be
restated as a theorem about sets, then it is hard to accept that theories belonging to these parts
of mathematics, as well as the relevant fragments of set theory, are suitable for occurring in sound
ia’s in which ‘Q’s’ is replaced by ‘theories’ and ‘L’ is replaced by ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’.
To see why, consider any version of arithmetic, let say Arith, and suppose Si to be an instance
of a scientific theory S that has recourse to an instance of Arith in which naturals numbers are
to it would be problematic for our construal of the indispensability relation only if it were admitted that such
indispensability in principle is independent of the specification of any particular task. But, why should one admit
this? Could one not, rather, take it that providing a final description or explanation of what the relevant scientific
theories are about is a particular task, namely either a descriptive or an explanatory one? If this is conceded, as
we think it should be, our charaterization of indispensability can be made perfectly compatible with this rather
implausible (at least in our opinion) conception of science. It would be enough to specify the parameter ‘h’ in
agreement with this particular task, and to consider the appropriate class of scientific theories (i.e. those at their
ultimate stage) in the argument’s premises.
53Putnam’s ia given above (cf. page 11) can be seen as a paradigmatic example for ia’s whereDβ-indispensability
is involved. Resnik’s pragmatic argument can be seen as a way of focusing onPβ-indispensability. Baker’s version of
ia (cf. page 20, above) is clearly based on Sβ-indispensability (as is the version of ia suggested by [Field, 1989], p.
15) and will be discussed in more details below. Colyvan’s argument (cf. page 19, above) is not explicitly relying on
a particular notion of indispensability: this seems to us partly due to the fact that the notion of indispensability
occurs in it in a schematic way, that should be then made precise according to different determinations. In
[Panza and Sereni, 2015] we suggest how the versions of ia commonly discussed can be retrieved by determination
of schematic premises from schematic ia’s cognate to the ones discussed here.
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taken to be sui generis objects and no appeal is made to set theory. There are, of course, countless
possible examples of this. It is highly plausible to admit that there is another instance Sj of S, or
an instance S∗j of another scientific theory S
∗ accomplishing the same descriptive or predictive task
as S, both of which have no recourse to Arith but rather to an appropriate fragment of set theory
in which Arith is recast. In the former case, Arith is neitherDβ-indispensable norPβ-indispensable
to S, which is already enough to block premise (ii) of any genuine ia where ‘Q’s’ is replaced by
‘theories’, ‘L’ is replaced by ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’ and the relevant scientific and mathematical theories
would respectively be S and Arith. In latter case, Arith is possibly Dβ-indispensable and/or Pβ-
indispensable to S, but not for any family of scientific theories including both S and S∗. Hence,
insofar as S and S∗ share the same descriptive or predictive task, it follows that this task can be
accomplished even though no recourse to textsfArith is made. This suggests that, in this latter
case, a genuine ia where ‘L’ is replaced by ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’, ‘Q’s’ by ‘theories’, and the only relevant
mathematical theory is Arith, would be unsound, both if S is the only relevant scientific theory,
and if the relevant scientific theories are those of a family of such theories including S and S∗. In
the former case, premise (ii) would be untrue; in the latter, premise (iii) would be untrue.
The same argument can be repeated with respect to the relevant fragment of set theory
(understood, again, as a framework in which other mathematical theories can be recast), if one
inverts the roles of this particular fragment of set theory and Arith in the reasoning above. Hence,
the same conclusions as above seem to hold if Arith is replaced by this fragment of set theory.
It still remains that, on the basis of the definitions advanced in §3.5, the two cases considered
are such that the family of mathematical theories composed of Arith and the relevant fragment
of set theory—call this family ‘AST’, for further reference—is possibly Dβ- or Pβ-indispensable
to S and to the family of scientific theories composed of S and S∗, respectively. Suppose this is
so, and suppose also that S and S∗ both have an appropriate property P . It follows that premise
(ii) of a genuine ia appropriately specified would be true in both scenarios. But is this also the
case for premise (iii)? Two cases are to be distinguished here.
The first occurs if the expression ‘their a’s’ in premise (iii) of Sc.IA0 is taken to refer con-
junctively to the a’s of the two theories composing AST. It seems clear that, in this first case, this
premise would be untrue, regardless of the determinations of ‘a’ and ‘A’, since, even if AST were
Dβ or Pβ-indispensable to either S or to the family of theories composed of S and S
∗, neither
Arith nor the relevant fragment of set theory would be, if taken individually.
The second case occurs if the expression ‘their a’s’ in premise (iii) of Sc.IA0 is taken to
refer disjunctively to the a’s of the two theories composing AST. In this second case, the reasons
for thinking, as it happened in the first case, that this premise is untrue are no longer enough
to support this conclusion. It does not seem to us, however, that there is any easily available
argument supporting the opposite conclusion that this premise would be true. Any supporter of
ia willing to endorse such an argument in a form appropriate to a similar case would have the
burden of providing such an argument. To make the situation clearer, let us suppose ‘P ’, ‘a’, and
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‘A’ to be so determined that this premise came to assert that, if AST is Dβ or Pβ-indispensable to
S or to the family of scientific theories composed of S and S∗, both of which are true, then either
the objects of Arith or those of the relevant fragment of set theory exist. Clearly, in order for the
premise to be true, it would be enough that either the objects of Arith or those of the relevant
fragment of set theory exist. But supposing that this is so would clearly beg the question with
respect to the relevant genuine ia, and claiming that this is what makes this premise true would
inescapably make such an ia circular. The point is rather whether the truth of the antecedent of
this implication is a sufficient reason for its consequent to hold. This is what the argument to be
provided should argue for. And, mutatis mutandis, this would also be the case if ‘P ’, ‘a’, and ‘A’
were determined in some other appropriate way.
It seem to us that such an argument could be hardly advanced. Still, let us suppose that it is
available. There would, then, be room for concluding that a genuine ia, whose premise (iii) refers
disjunctively to the a’s of the two theories composing AST, is non-vacuously sound. But, then,
its conclusion would be that either the a’s of Arith, or those of the relevant fragment of set theory,
meet the condition A, for an appropriate determination of ‘a’, and ‘A’. And this would be at odds
with the spirit underlying ia’s, according to which we want to establish that certain mathematical
a’s meet the condition A because the corresponding theories are somehow indispensable to some
scientific theories, and not that some or other mathematical a’s meet this condition because one or
another among the corresponding theories are somehow indispensable to some scientific theories.
This seems confirmed by how considerations on alternative foundations for mathematics, like those
offered by [Baker, 2003] (by developing suggestions from [Benacerraf, 1965]), are usually regarded
in the context of discussions on ia: in these cases it is indeed usually argued that the possibility
of having different incompatible and still in some sense mathematically equivalent foundations for
classical mathematics (e.g. through either set theory or category theory) is a reason for denying
that ia can provide justification for the commitment in any of the objects of those theories in
particular, and hence to deliver what it is supposed to deliver54.
Moreover, even if one were content with settling for an ia with a minimal anti-nominalist
conclusion ia as the foregoing55, one would end up supporting a very weak form of platonism,
54Compare what [Baker, 2003], p. 58, claims:
Category theory is not an extension of set theory, nor vice versa, and the ontologies of the two theories
are entirely non-overlapping. Thus neither set theory nor category theory is indispensable for science,
because neither provides a unique foundation for mathematics. Hence we are not rationally compelled
to believe in the existence of sets, nor are we rationally compelled to believe in the existence of
categories. Our ontological commitment to mathematical objects cannot be made more specific than
a disjunctive commitment to sets-or-categories. [. . . ] Commitment to a specific ontology of abstract
objects cannot be derived from the indispensability argument alone.
55That some such minimal anti-nominalist conclusion may be considered by some in the context of an ia based
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veridicalism, or externality, and indeed one rather alien to most current versions of these views.
Consider platonism. The purpose of most of its current versions is not merely to secure some
weak ontological claim concerning the existence of some mathematical objects, but also to explain
how we can have epistemic access to these objects—something that seems impossible if one is
not even able to tell with precision which objects one is speaking of. True, many formulations
of ia’s feature a very general conclusion to the extent that there exist mathematical objects, or
we are justified in believing they do. But as we have argued before, these arguments should be
merely considered as schematic, and this makes it difficult to assess whether they are, in some
sense, sound or not. If we had no instance of such an argument, we would then be unable to
assess whether the conclusion is well supported or not. Moreover, it seems to us that the common
understanding of that conclusion is as relating to particular instances of such arguments, and thus
to particular mathematical objects (as opposed to some objects or other). This seems consistent
with the general attitude of supporters of ia (see again the end of Baker’s quotation in footnote
54).
Let us now come back to our main discussion. The arguments given above cannot be repeated
in the case where ‘L’ is replaced by ‘Sβ’ and the relevant descriptive and predictive tasks are
replaced by an explanatory task. The reason is that it is not plausible at all to admit that, in
the case where Si is an instance of a scientific theory S that has recourse to a deductively well-
balanced instance of Arith in which natural numbers are taken to be sui generis objects, there is
another instance Sj of S, or an instance S
∗
j of another scientific theory S
∗, accomplishing the same
explicative task as S, that have not recourse to Arith but rather to some fragment of set theory in
which Arith is recast. Indeed, while it is plausible that the replacement of Arith with this fragment
of set theory will preserve the descriptive and predictive powers of the relevant scientific theory,
it is far less plausible that it will preserve its explicative power, since this power may essentially
depend on the specific way in which natural numbers are defined in Arith. For example, if we
suppose Arith is Frege Arithmetic, one could argue that its defining natural numbers as numbers
of concepts allows one to appeal to it for a crystal-clear explanation of why there are as many
animals that are either dogs or cats as there are mammals in a zoo where there are only dogs,
cats, crocodiles and eagles, whereas this explanation cannot be (as clearly) given by appealing
to any rephrasing of natural numbers within pure set theory (where natural numbers are, for
example, coded with Zermelo’s sets like {. . . {Ø} . . .}). In the next section we will consider other
reasons for doubting that any genuine ia based of ‘Sβ’-indispensability can be given.
Before coming to that, let us change our perspective, and consider mathematical theories,
independently of the possibility of rephrasing them within set theory, this latter theory being
considered in turn as an autonomous mathematical theory, specifically concerned with sets as sui
generis objects. With respect to epistemic ia’s, however, an argument similar to the previous one
can also be advanced for arithmetic and real analysis.
on explanatory indispensability is considered by [Sereni, 2015]’s rejoinder to [Molinini, 2015], in this volume.
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Consider, for example, any version RealAn of real analysis and suppose that Si is an instance
of a scientific theory S that has recourse to an instance of RealAn. It is highly plausible to admit
that there will be another instance Sj of S, or an instance S
∗
j of another scientific theory S
∗
that has no recourse to RealAn, insofar as it replaces it with an appropriate theory of rational
numbers—that is, with an appropriately extended version of arithmetic—, which accomplishes
the same descriptive or predictive task as Si in such a way that no difference among the two,
with respect to the accomplishment of this task, can be appreciated on the basis of our capacity
of discerning their descriptive and/or the predictive power (on the basis of which we assign to
these theories the epistemic property PE). Hence, if S is PE, also S∗ is so, and there are good
reasons for thinking that the conditions h from whichDβ-indispensability andPβ-indispensability
respectively depend are such that, whatever S might be, RealAn is neither Dβ-indispensable nor
Pβ-indispensable to S, or it is possibly Dβ-indispensable and/or Pβ-indispensable to S but not
to a family of scientific theories including both S and S∗. From here, the argument can go on on
the same lines as above by replacing Arith and its recasting within set theory with RealAn and
the appropriate theory of rational numbers.
The same argument does not apply in the case of ontological or mixed ia’s, for the following
reason. For such an ia to be correct, the scientific theory S it involves must have a certain
ontological property PO. Now, one could argue that replacing real numbers with rational ones in
Si inevitably results in passing from S to a new theory S
∗ which is not PO any more. Suppose
that PO is (external) truth (as defined earlier). One could argue that Si’s having recourse to
RealAn is essential for it to be an instance of a(n externally) true theory, so that replacing RealAn
with a theory of rational numbers transforms Si in an instance of another theory S
∗ that is not
(externally) true any more. Hence, whatever S∗ might be, it cannot accomplish any appropriate
relevant task that S accomplishes, since for this to be the case S∗ has to be (externally) true true
like S is.
So far so good. But how is it possible to claim that when one replaces real numbers with
rational numbers in (an instance of) a true scientific theory, this will inevitably result in getting
a new, (externally) untrue theory, if not by admitting (either explicitly or implicitly) that real
numbers are part of what makes this theory (externally) true? Once this is admitted, there is no
room for getting a non-circularly sound genuine ontological or mixed ia involving any version of
real analysis. Such a genuine ia could perhaps be sound and even non-vacuously so, but it will
inevitably be circular, and then, at most circularly sound. The same argument applies, of course,
mutatis mutandis, for any ontological or mixed ia involving real analysis, that is for any other
determination of PO.
There seems to be little hope, then, of getting a non-circularly sound genuine ia’s involving
real analysis in which ‘Q’s’ is replaced by ‘theories’ and ‘L’ is replaced by ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’.
For (finitary) arithmetic things look even simpler. In order to show that there cannot be
any sound genuine ia’s involving (finitary) arithmetic in which ‘Q’s’ is replaced by ‘theories’ and
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‘L’ is replaced by ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’, it is enough to notice that natural numbers can be replaced with
numerical quantifiers in any scientific statement in which they occur, without loosing or weakening
the descriptive and predictive power of this statement.
There seems to be no analogous argument for set theory conceived as an autonomous mathe-
matical theory specifically concerned with sets. It is not clear, however, that there is any suitable
argument available suggesting that a genuine ia based on descriptive or predictive indispensabil-
ity and concerned with set theory so conceived is forthcoming56. However, one could argue along
the following lines. Let us consider the role that could be played by set theory, conceived as an
autonomous theory, within a given scientific theory S, relative to its descriptive and predictive
power—that is, let us concern ourselves with ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’-indispensability. It can be argued that
its role amounts, globally, to the role that could be played, piecemeal and conjunctively, by other
mathematical theories, also conceived as autonomous. For instance, a sub-system of set theory
will play the role of arithmetic, another will play the role of function theory, another will play
the role of real analysis, and so on. If an autonomous mathematical theory (independently of the
fact that it could in principle be rephrased within set theory) can be found to play the role of
each of these sub-systems of set theory, it would follow from what we have said above that no
particular fragment of set theory among these will be by itself either ‘Dβ’ or ‘Pβ’-indispensable
to S, nor to a family of theories accomplishing the relevant task that S accomplishes. One could
then argue by this piecemeal reasoning that no genuine, non-vacuously sound ia for the ‘Dβ’ or
‘Pβ’-indispensability of set theory by itself will be available
57.
Of course, what we have said does not necessarily extend to any possible genuine ia based
on Dβ-indispensability or Pβ-indispensability, and a fortiori any possible genuine ia based on a
56This is not to say, of course, that some known versions of ia could not be read as such. For one, Quine’s
long exposition in chapter 5 of [Quine, 1960] can easily be read, and has indeed been read, as outlining a version
of indispensability argument for classes. The main reason offered by Quine for being committed just to classes,
rather than, say, to classes and natural numbers, is that classes neatly allow for “the explication of the various
other sorts of abstract objects” (p. 267). This would make Quine’s argument irrelevant in the present context,
where we are looking for arguments based on the descriptive or predictive power of set theory beyond the fact
that it allows for the reformulation of other mathematical theories. Quine also adds that “the power of the notion
[of class] on other counts, [. . . ] keeps it in continuing demand in mathematics and elsewhere as a working notion
in its own”, so that it “confers a power that it is not known to be available through less objectionable channels”.
These additional reasons would be relevant here only if it turned out that they did not depend on the power of
set theory (the notion of class) to systematize and unify different (mathematical and non mathematical) theories
by allowing for their reformulation in terms of classes. Here we just want to stress that it is not so clear that this
is the case. Therefore, it is all but clear that Quine’s remarks provide an argument that a genuine ia based on
descriptive or predictive indispensability and concerned with set theory as such is forthcoming.
57In this scenario, it would still be possible for set theory to be part of a family of mathematical theories which,
as such, are ‘Dβ ’ or ‘Pβ ’-indispensable to a given scientific theory, or to a family of such theories; one could, then,
argue that some genuine, non-vacuously and non-circularly sound ia concerned with this family of mathematical
theories, whose premise (iii) is intended disjunctively, as explained above at pages 38-39, may be available. Here,
however, the same considerations raised there apply too.
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non-explanatory form of indispensability. However, the preceding considerations seem to raise a
significant concern on the actual possibility of attaining such a non-circular and non-vacuoulsy
sound argument.
4.2.2 Explanatory Indispensability
Section summary. We explore attempts to find sound genuine ia’s based on the notion
of Sβ-indispensability. We consider the role that Inference to Best Explanation can
have in supporting versions of ia based on this modality of indispensability, and
discuss Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument. We argue that in all versions
of ia envisioned so far, an appeal to Sβ-indispensability relies on claims that are
highly dubious or on question-begging readings of premise (iii). Also by relying on
the notions and distinctions introduced in the previous sections, we again submit
that we have not yet been presented with an instance of a sound genuine ia based on
explanatory indispensability, and offer evidence that arguments of this sort can hardly
be found.
For ia’s based on explanatory indispensability, things are different.
Let us begin by considering epistemic ia’s for externality. Starting from Sc.IA0, replace again
‘Q’s’ with ‘theories’, and ‘P ’ with ‘PE’, ‘L’ with ‘Sβ’, ‘the a’s of some Q’s’ with ‘the consequences
of some theories’, ‘meet the condition A’ with ‘are ϑ-justified’, so as to get instances of its three
premises suitable for such an ia, namely:
[Sc.IAE,Ext,Exp3 ] i) Some scientific theories are P
E.
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories
are Sβ-indispensable to them.
iii) If some theories are Sβ-indispensable to some scientific theories
which are PE, then their consequences are ϑ-justified.
Of course, one could take here ϑ-justification to be a property that the consequences of certain
theories have just insofar as these theories are Sβ-indispensable to some scientific theories that
are PE. But this would lead to a problem analogous to that advanced for strengthened epistemic
ia’s in relation to the analogous option for that case. Differently from what we have seen above
for strengthened ia’s, however, no problem would be engendered by taking ϑ-justification to
be an external property possibly enjoyed by the consequences of some theories that are not Sβ-
indispensable to some scientific theories that are PE (namely a property that these theories would
have beyond their being consequences of certain theories).
To make things clearer, suppose that this property is a property that a statement has just in
case it presents itself as true to our rational consideration, because of what it says, and of some
circumstances which are independent of its being a consequence of a given theory. Let us say, that
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a statement having this property presents itself as true. This property is, by definition, indepen-
dent of the relevant statements being consequences of some theories that are Sβ-indispensable to
some scientific theories that are PE. Nonetheless, their being so may help bestow this property
to them. Premise Sc.IAE,Ext,Exp3 .iii becomes then the following:
[Sc.IAE,Ext,Exp,PrT4 ] iii) If some theories are Sβ-indispensable to some scientific theories
which are PE, then their consequences presents themselves as
true.
The question is then whether Sβ-indispensability is such that being Sβ-indispensable to some
scientific theories with property PE is a sufficient condition for a theory to present itself as true.
This is likely to depend on the way Sβ-indispensability is determined. Still, it is reasonable
to suppose that, granting a positive answer is possible at all, it will be forthcoming in a case in
which Sβ-indispensability depends on an occurrence of inference to the best explanation (IBE).
Let us, then, focus on this case, and confine ourselves to the simplest sub-case in which Sβ-
indispensability is supposed to relate single theories to single theories. Take then a theory T to
be Sβ-indispensable to a scientific theory S if and only if any instance of S which provides the
best explanation of some relevant accepted claims E’s has somehow recourse to an instance of T58.
This entails that any theory T is Sβ-indispensable to a scientific theory S no instance of which
provides the best explanation of the relevant accepted claim E’s. Still, for this determination of
Sβ-indispensability to satisfy the requirements advanced in § 3.5, such a scientific theory S cannot
be PE in this case. Suppose then that, for a scientific theory S to be PE, it has to provide the
best explanation for some accepted claims E’s pertaining to its range of application, and that
another theory T is Sβ-indispensable to such a scientific theory if and only if any instance of S
which provides such a best explanation of claims E’s has somehow recourse to an instance of T
(supposing, of course, that a scientific theory provides the best explanation of some claims E’s if
and only if some instances of it, but not necessarily all of them, do). The question thus becomes
the following: is it sufficient to acknowledge that a scientific theory S is PE and that any instance
of it which provides the best explanation of the relevant claims E’s has appropriately recourse
to an instance of another theory T, in order to conclude that the consequences of T present
themselves as true?
Consider the most famous example that has been advanced with the aim of offering a positive
answer, Baker’s example of a particular subspecies of periodical cicadas. The relevant scientific
theory S is here some fragment of evolutionary biology dealing with the life cycle of some species
of periodical cicadas of the Magicicada genus, while E is the claim that the adult cicadas of
these species emerge from the nymphal stage “after either 13 years or 17 years depending on the
geographical area” ([Baker, 2005], p. 229). Call the former ‘EvBiolCic’, and the latter ‘13-17LC’.
58This means, of course, that the relevant specification of the parameters h and k capture what it is for a theory
to provide the best explanation of the relevant accepted claims E’s.
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This example becomes relevant for the present discussion as soon as one claims that arithmetic,
or at least some appropriate fragment of it, or some version of it, or some fragment of such an
appropriate version of it, are Sβ-indispensable to EvBiolCic since the best explanation of 13-17LC
requires an appeal to the statement that 13 and 17 are prime numbers, as well as to a simple
arithmetical theorem about primes numbers, and that this entails that any instance of EvBiolCic
which provides such a best explanation has necessarily recourse to an instance of arithmetic or
of the relevant fragment of it. There may be several reasons for doubting that this is so. Still,
for the sake of our present argument, let us concedes this, and call ‘Arith∗’ either arithmetic as
such, or the relevant fragment, or version, or fragment of a version of it. What we have to ask is
then whether this is enough for concluding that the theorems of Arith∗ present themselves as true.
Whatever Arith∗ might be, it seems obvious that its theorems should include the relevant theorem
about prime numbers, or at least a restriction of this theorem to the small prime numbers the
consideration of which is enough for delivering the relevant explanation59.
So, we can confine ourselves to considering whether Arith∗’s alleged Sβ-indispensability for
EvBiolCic is enough for concluding that this theorem, even thus restricted, presents itself as true.
It should be borne in mind that, in the context of the present discussion, the property of
presenting itself as true has to be understood as an external property of that theorem. It seems,
then, that in order to get a positive answer to the question above, one must claim that what
makes Arith∗ Sβ-indispensable to EvBiolCic (that is, what makes it the case that any instance
of EvBiolCic which provides the best explanation of 13-17LC will somehow recur to an instance
of Arith∗) is not merely the fact that appealing to prime numbers (or maybe only to small ones
among them) and to their properties is needed for the relevant best explanation to be stated, but
rather that prime numbers themselves (or possibly small ones among them), or at least some sort
of circumstances involving these numbers themselves, provide such a best explanation. Now, it
is easy to see that this is not so at all. Indeed, the relevant content of 13-17LC for the purpose
of explanation—that is, what has to be explained—is not properly that adult periodical cicadas
emerge from the nymphal stage after either 13 or 17 years, but rather that they emerge from the
nymphal stage when they actually do: we appeal to 15 and 17 in order to describe a fact which
59Pincock objects to Baker (cf. [Pincock, 2012], pp. 212-213) that his alleged explanation fails what Pincock
calls the ‘weaker alternatives problem’: for an agent that does not already believe that there are infinitely many
primes, there seems to be no reason for preferring an explanation based on the claim that prime periods minimize
intersections with predators’ life-cycles, rather than an explanation based on the claim that prime periods less
than 100 years minimize intersection. Hence, there is no reason for accepting, on the basis of an application of IBE
to the cicada case, that there exist infinitely many prime numbers, rather that merely those less than 100. The
point seems well taken in the framework of Pincock’s discussion, and is reminiscent of a similar point raised by
[Peressini, 1997, pp. 220-223] as the problem of “the unit of indispensability”. However, we believe it is possible to
object to Baker’s argument even if it is admitted that one can decide whether the theory to be taken into account
in the case at issue is arithmetic as such, or a fragment of it only dealing with small natural numbers, for example
with those less than 100. Hence, for the sake of our present argument again, we take for granted that a decision
between these two alternative theories is possible.
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is, in itself, perfectly independent of the existence and properties of any number and could in
principle be described without any appeal to those numbers, or possibly to any number at all60.
And what provides the alleged best explanation is nothing but the circumstance that the life
cycle of periodical cicada is such as to minimise the “frequency of intersection” with the life cycle
of hypothetical periodic predators or of hypothetical similar subspecies suitable for hybridisation
([Baker, 2005], pp. 230-31), which also is perfectly independent of the existence and properties
of any sort of number. Arguing that Arith∗ is Sβ-indispensable to EvBiolCic merely reduces to
arguing that the appeal to prime numbers (or possibly just to small ones) and to their relevant
properties is required in order to state such a best explanation; for example, it is required in order
to give a clear description of this non-mathematical circumstance to someone already familiar with
arithmetic or a fragment of it. In other terms, Arith∗ is at most an indispensable tool to be used
by evolutionary biologists, in the present historical conjuncture, in stating the best explanation of
13-17LC. But this will not certainly suffice to ensure that the relevant theorem of Arith∗ presents
itself as true.
But this is not all, yet. What is even more relevant for our present purpose is that admitting
that what makes Arith∗ Sβ-indispensable to EvBiolCic depends on the existence and properties
of prime numbers themselves (or possibly just on those of small ones) would undoubtedly beg
the question against the anti-platonist opponent, and make the relevant ia’s circular. For this
would require acknowledging that Arith∗ is actually about natural numbers, and says of them that
they meet some conditions relevant for their playing, by themselves, an explanatory role; and this
entails that Arith∗ tells us something true of these numbers. In order to conclude that Arith∗, or
at least some of its theorems, presents itself as true, one should then already acknowledge that
they are actually true.
The point can easily be generalised. For an instance of premise Sc.IAE,Ext,Exp,PrT4 .iii to be
plausibly taken to be true for a scientific theory S, under the supposition that Sβ-indispensability
relates single theories to single theories, it must be admitted that what makes T Sβ-indispensable
to S is not merely that having recourse to T is needed for the best explanation of claims E’s to be
stated; rather, this best explanation should be assumed to be provided by that which T is taken
to be about, or at least by some sort of circumstances involving that which T is taken to be about.
But this assumption begs the question, and makes the relevant ia’s circular. Moreover, if we are
considering the case in which T is a mathematical theory, this can hardly be the case, at least
if mathematical theories are understood as suggested in § 3.4. For these theories can hardly be
60A way of providing such a number-free description has been suggested by [Rizza, 2011]. [Baker, 2009], pp. 618-
622, had previsously suggested that such a description is not possible, since mathematical terms such as ‘prime’
cannot be eliminated from the statement expressing the explanandum in the periodical cicadas case. Notice, in
passing, that Baker there also answers to the challenge raised by [Bangu, 2008] according to which he would be
begging the question against the nominalist, since the explanandum must be formulated in mathematical terms
(and obviously believed true).
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taken to speak of things that can provide in themselves, or be involved in themselves, in some sort
of circumstances which provide the best explanation of some accepted claims E’s that a scientific
theory could be plausibly be required to explain. Such claims E’s cannot but concern an enquiry
resulting from some sort of empirical experimental practice. And it seems hard to concede that
an actual mathematical theory, a mathematical theory actually involved in scientific practice,
could be taken, without begging the question, to speak of things that can plausibly provide in
themselves, or be involved in themselves in some sort of circumstances which provide, the best
explanation of such claims. At most, one can acknowledge that an actual mathematical theory
is such that appealing to what it putatively is about is required for describing, in a perspicuous
way, what actually provides the best explanation of such claims to peoples familiar with a certain
mathematical background.
One can even push this objection further, and object that it is even question-begging to main-
tain that the fact that a mathematical theory is indispensably appealed to in what we take to
be the best explanation of some scientific phenomena can, by itself, justify that mathematical
theory. Something along these lines has been suggested by [Pincock, 2012], (§§10.2-10.3)61. Pin-
cock’s point, in a nutshell, is that “mathematical claims must be justified prior to their use in
explanation if they are to make their explanatory contribution” (p. 217). In other words, a scien-
tist that is offering a given explanation of some phenomena will have to antecedently believe the
mathematical claims (s)he is employing to be true (or at least, we might add, appropriately jus-
tified), if (s)he is to understand her/his own explanation at all. If (s)he has no way of explaining
how scientists can be justified in their mathematical beliefs “prior to their use in science”, there
is little hope “that some kind of indispensability argument could do better” ([Pincock, 2012],
pp. 219-220). This is, at least, what follows from the account of the application of mathematics
that Pincock adopts. Another alternative account could lead to a different, or even opposite,
conclusion. Still, it remains that the mere plausibility of Pincock’s account suggests that a gen-
uine non-circular ia based on explanatory indispensability requires an appropriate account of the
application of mathematics, alternative to Pincock’s, that a supporter of such an argument is,
then, required to offer.
A way of avoiding the difficulty could be to imagine a scenario in which a genuine epistemic
ia’s based on explanatory indispensability work in a context in which other epistemic ia’s, not
based on explanatory considerations, have conferred justification to some mathematical beliefs.
Indeed, in a proper (as opposed to a strengthened) epistemic ia, nothing requires that indis-
pensability for appropriate scientific theories is the only source of justification for mathematical
statements. There is then no obstacle in imagining genuine epistemic ia’s based on explanatory
indispensability working in a context in which some mathematical beliefs have been otherwise
justified. In this case, the relevant genuine epistemic ia’s would merely enhance or extend the
61Pincock makes his point in connection with the adoption of a contrastive account of IBE. Our present remarks
are indipendent of the adoption of such an account.
47
already available justification for mathematical beliefs. This would make such explanatory ia’s
much less useful, or not privileged as sources of justification, at worst; but Pincock’s argument
would make them neither circular nor unsound.
The aim of our previous considerations is to rise serious doubts on the possibility of having
such an ia. Suppose, indeed, that the best explanation of certain claims has been identified
(by whatever account of IBE), and that it is such that a certain mathematical theory is Sβ-
indispensable to a scientific theory which is PE. If our considerations above are correct, it would
still be the case that taking an instance of premise Sc.IAE,Ext,Exp,PrT4 .iii to be true would beg
the question (so as to make the corresponding ia’s circular), and be highly doubtful.
It is not difficult to see that the same considerations also apply (without any modification)
to epistemic ia’s for platonism whose third premise is an instance of the following schema, under
the admission that Sβ-indispensability is supposed to relate single theories to single theories:
[Sc.IAE,P,Exp3 ] iii) If some theories are Sβ-indispensable to some scientific theories
which are PE, then their putative objects are to be justifiably
taken to exist.
Indeed, in order to argue that an instance of this premise is meaningful (and, a fortiori, in order
to argue that it is true), one has to admit that the former theories do have some putative objects.
This is tantamount to claiming that these theories speak of these objects. Hence, what has been
said above concerning what the theory T is taken to be about directly applies to them: for an
instance of premise Sc.IAE,P,Exp3 .iii to be true, the reason for claiming that the former theories
(each of them being individually taken) are Sβ-indispensable to the latter (each of them being
also individually taken) has to depend on the relevant best explanation’s being provided by the
very objects that the former theories are supposed to be about, and this both begs the question
and is highly dubious.
The same considerations can also be easily extended to the case where Sβ-indispensability is
supposed to relate families of theories to single theories, or single theories to families of theories,
or families of theories to families of theories, and, with slight modifications, also to other sorts
of epistemic ia’s based on Sβ-indispensability both for externality and for platonism. Looking at
the argument, it is also easy to see that it does not essentially depend on the assumption, which
we have made so far, that Sβ-indispensability depends on an occurrence of IBE. Hence, one can
reach the same conclusion also by maintaining (on the basis of some argument which we are not
able to imagine) that Sβ-indispensability goes without IBE.
The situation is certainly not better for ontological and mixed ia’s based on explanatory
indispensability. Replacing an epistemic property PE with an ontological property PO does not
change the situation for the third premise of an ia’s, both in the case of arguments for veridicalism
or externality and for platonism, and whatever condition ‘A’ may stands for. In all these cases,
for an instance of this premise to be true, in the case where the Q’s are taken to be theories,
the alleged Sβ-indispensability has to depend on the fact that the relevant explanation (be it the
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best or not) is provided by that which these theories are about, so that the point made above
still applies.
5 Conclusions
Our aim, in § 3, has been that of providing a systematic and exhaustive account of all possible
varieties of ia’s, both proper and strengthened. Each of the latter includes one of the former as
a sub-argument. The former are intended to offer sufficient conditions for their conclusions. The
latter offer necessary and sufficient ones. These conclusions can be of different nature, but they
all concern either some sort of mathematical statements (most usually theorems) or mathematical
entities or putative objects. Statements occur either in ia’s for veridicalism, the thesis that these
statements are true, or for externality, the thesis that these statements have an epistemic virtue
external to the theory to which they belong to, or, more in general, to the justificatory system
from which they result. Entities or putative objects occur in ia’s for platonism, the thesis that
there exist objects that mathematics is about. ia’s for veridicalism are all ontological, that is,
they are based on the assumption that some scientific theories have an appropriate ontological
property, for example (external) truth. ia’s for externality are all epistemic, instead, that is, they
are based on the assumption that some scientific theories have an appropriate epistemic property,
for example they are rationally justified. Among ia’s for platonism some are ontological, other
epistemic.
The purpose of this account is not only, and not mainly, to offer a complete synopsis of all
possible ia’s. Our main purpose has rather been to show that providing a genuine ia, that is, a
particular fully determined version of the argument, is far from easy. So far from easy is it that, at
the best of our knowledge, no such an ia has been offered yet. What have rather been offered are
several schematic ia’s, that is, arguments schemas waiting for future determinations. Argument
schemas are valid or invalid, and most of those that have been offered are valid, indeed. But, in
general, argument schemas are neither sound nor unsound: genuine ia’s are. Hence, we submit
that, for the most part, recent discussions about the soundness or unsoundeness of the different
ia’s actually available miss their target, since they concern the truth or untruth of essentially
indeterminate premises. According to us, before discussing whether these premises are (plausibly)
true or untrue, one should clearly determine them, that is, make clear what they are asserting
exactly. This is especially so for the premises or the parts of them which are concerned with the
relation of indispensability. Often, in the context of an ia, one argues or denies that something
is indispensable to something else, or that the indispensability of something for something else
entails this or that consequence, without making clear not only what it means that something is
indispensable to something else, but also what is supposed to be indispensable to what. In §§ 3.4
and 3.5, we have tried to account for all the specifications which are required in order to make
49
such claims determinate, and thus possibly true or untrue.
Our aim, in § 4, has been to suggest that no genuine ia has a chance to be sound, unless
vacuously or circularly. It goes without saying that we have not examined all possible genuine
ia’s. This would have been virtually impossible. And this not so much because of the intractable
length and complexity of such an enquiry, but rather because of the fact that this would have
required considering a number of possible determinations of the schematic ia’s listed in § 3 that we
are quite far from being able to imagine. Our strategy has rather been that of identifying different
constraints that the determinations required in order to transform schematic into genuine ia’s
have to respect, and then arguing against the possibility of respecting all of them at once without
getting either circular or vacuously sound arguments. To this purpose, we have focused on some
possible schemas of premises, by arguing that no appropriate instance of them can provide true
premisses for a non-circular and non-vacuously sound argument. This has led us to offer a number
of sufficient reasons for discarding the possibility of non-circular and non-vacuously sound ia’s
of different sorts. But we are far for thinking that we have, in this way, expounded all possible
reasons by which a genuine ia can be unsound or circular or only vacuously sound. Many other
possible reasons may be envisaged, for example some that would undermine the truth of the
different instances of the first premise of ontological ia’s of any sort.
Hence, even if we do not take ourselves to have offered conclusive reasons against the possi-
bility of offering a non-circular and non-vacuously sound genuine ia, it is still an outcome of the
foregoing discussion that in order to provide one, it is by far not enough to refute one or more
of the arguments we presented above. It will also and overall be necessary to provide all the
determinations suitable for transforming a schematic ia in a genuine ia, and then to argue with
due care for its non-circularity and non-vacuous soundness.
Many supporters of veridicalism, externality, or platonism might be willing to get a non-
circular and non-vacuously sound argument for their views. We clearly do not take our arguments
to go against those views themselves, nor do we believe we have offered any evidence against them.
We have only tried to show, defeasibly as this could be done, that they can hardly be supported
by some forms of ia.
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